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The quality of the judicial system depends upon the quality of decisions
that judges make. Even the most talented and dedicated judges surely commit
occasional mistakes, but the public understandably expects judges to avoid
systematic errors. This expectation, however, might be unrealistic. Psycholo-
gists who study human judgment and choice have learned that people fre-
quently fall prey to cognitive illusions that produce systematic errors in
judgment. Even though judges are experienced, well-trained, and highly mo-
tivated decision makers, they might be vulnerable to cognitive illusions. We
report the results of an empirical study designed to determine whether five
common cognitive illusions (anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the repre-
sentativeness heuristic, and egocentric biases) would influence the decision-
making processes of a sample of 167federal magistrate judges. Although the
judges in our study appeared somewhat less susceptible to two of these illu-
sions (framing effects and the representativeness heuristic) than lay decision
makers, we found that each of the five illusions we tested had a significant
impact on judicial decision making. judges, it seems, are human. Like the
rest of us, their judgment is affected by cognitive illusions that can produce
systematic errors in judgment.
INTRODUCTION
Alexander Hamilton observed that judges in a constitutional de-
mocracy possess "neither force nor will but merely judgment."' The
I THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
("[The judiciary] may truly be said to have neither force nor will but merelyjudgment; and
must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of itsjudg-
ments.") (typeface altered).
[Vol. 86:777
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judicial role has expanded since Hamilton's day,2 but tie institutional
legitimacy of the judiciary still depends on the quality of the judg-
ments thatjudges make. Even the most talented and dedicated judges
surely commit occasional mistakes, but the public understandably ex-
pects judges to avoid systematic errors.3 This expectation, however,
might be unrealistic. Empirical evidence suggests that even highly
qualified judges inevitably rely on cognitive decision-making processes
that can produce systematic errors in judgment.
Legal scholars representing various schools of thought have long
argued thatjudges do not merely find facts or apply legal principles in
a completely accurate and unbiased fashion. Legal realists have ar-
gued that judges make choices that reflect their political ideology- 4
proponents of critical legal studies have complained that judges favor
the existing power structure;5 critical race and feminist scholars have
argued that race and gender heavily influence judicial decisions;6 and
law-and-economics scholars have asserted that judges make self-serv-
2 Judges now not only "adjudicat[e] the merits of issues presented to them by liti-
gants" but also "meet[ ] with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of disputes and
to supervise case preparation." Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudg-es, 96 -LRv. L RL'v. 376, 376-
77 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik, ManagerialJudges]. See generallyJudith Resnik, Trial as Error,
Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article I, 113 HRtv. L Ra.% 924 (2000)
(documenting the changing role of the federal judiciary during the twentieth century).
3 See ROBERT E. KEaroN, KEErON ON JUDGING IN T-HE A. tErIA, La%. S 'rMm § 1.3.1
(1999) (noting that judges are obliged to make an "impartial application of principles").
Several economic models of adjudication demonstrate that substantive law can be imple-
mented effectively even ifjudges make random mistakes. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, "Tte Vlate
of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Anasis, 23 J. LEal. STUD. 307, 311-23, 315-55
(1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuray, in the Determination of Liabilio, 37J.L &
EcoN. 1, 1-3 (1994); Eric A. Posner, A Thory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical
JudicialError, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 749, 767-69 (2000). Systematic errors, on the other hand,
distort substantive law. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Ptedure and
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 406-08 (1973); Steven Shavell, The Appeals
Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24J. LEal. SrTD. 379, 425-26 (1995).
4 See generallyJmoEM FRANF, COURTS oN TRiu Myrn ,D Rrwm' I% A,%,m J*s.
-rcE (1949) (documenting the legal realist position on judging); FelLx S. Cohen, Transen-
dental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUm. L RE%'. 809, 846 (1935) (suggesting
that "the political, economic, and professional background and activities of our various
judges" are the "the motivating forces which mold legal decisions"). For a discussion of
contemporary incarnations of legal realism, see Edward L Rubin, The New Legal Process, the
Synthesis of Discourse; and the Microanalysis of lnstitutions, 109 I-L t\. L RE'. 1393 (1996).
5 See, e-g., MAR KELttAN, A GUIDE TO CITIC.L LEGl.M STUDIEs 45-48 (1987).
6 See generally Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of
Fright: A History, 88 MicH. L RE,. 814,862-64 (1990) (arguing that the fact that oirtually all
nineteenth-century judges were men, while plaintiffs in certain types of cases were mostly
women, influenced the development of tort law); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & An-
drew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judical
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L RE%% 1377, 1385-88 (1998) (revieuing empirical research on race
and gender biases in judges); Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing Deisions of Blad and l73ite
Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities, 24 Lw & Soc'v RE%,. 1197, 1198 (1990) (review-
ing the critical race literature on judges).
2001]
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ing decisions designed to advance their political fortunesY Our re-
search, however, identifies a more fundamental source of systematic
judicial error: wholly apart from political orientation and self-interest,
the very nature of human thought can induce judges to make consis-
tent and predictable mistakes in particular situations.
Our thesis arises from psychological research on human judg-
ment and choice. Psychologists have learned that human beings rely
on mental shortcuts, which psychologists often refer to as "heuristics,"
to make complex decisions.8 Reliance on these heuristics facilitates
good judgment most of the time, but it can also produce systematic
errors in judgment.9 Just as certain patterns of visual stimuli can fool
people's eyesight, leading them to see things that are not really there,
certain fact patterns can fool people's judgment, leading them to be-
lieve things that are not really true.10 Reliance on these heuristics can
create cognitive illusions that produce erroneous judgments.1 I
Decades of research on juries indicates that cognitive illusions ad-
versely affect the quality of adjudication. 12 Researchers have found,
for example, that juries believe that litigants should have predicted
events that no one could have predicted,13 allow irrelevant or inadmis-
sible information to influence liability determinations, 14 defer to arbi-
7 See generallyJonathan R Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Pro.
cedure 23J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 630-32 (1994) (discussing thejudiciary's "bureaucratic pref-
erences"); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Eveybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 1 (1993) (reviewing judges' behavior using a
.model in which judicial utility is a function mainly of income, leisure, and judicial vot-
ing"). See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDiCIAL BEHIAVIOR (1997) (reviewing
scholarship on judicial behavior).
8 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). For a detailed description of this work, see JtDN Ier
UNDER UNCERTAIN. HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tvcr-
sky eds., 1982); see also Sco-rr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OFJUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
109-30, 145-52 (1993).
9 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 8, at 1124 ("In general, these heuristics are quite
useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.").
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See RobertJ. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE
1046 (1989) (reviewing research on juries).
13 See Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade, &John W. Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases:
Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & Hum. BE LAV. 597,
609 (1999); Kim A. Kamin &JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 99 (1995); SusanJ. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Detemnina-
tions of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEAv. 501, 510-12 (1996); Merric
Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing
Arguments, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 671, 680-81 (1998).
14 See Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal
Decision Making, 25J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 295-97 (1996) (demonstrating that the addition of a
clearly inferior third verdict option alters choices made by mockjurors); Stanley Sue, Ron-
ald E. Smith, & Cathy Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated
Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 350-51 (1973); William C. Thomp-
[Vol. 86:777
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trary numerical estimates,' 5 and rely on incoherent methods to
calculate damages.' 6
But what about judges? In the day-to-day operation of the legal
system, judges are much more important than juries.1 7 They decide
roughly as many cases at trial as juries do, 18 they determine the out-
come of roughly seven times as many cases as juries by ruling on dis-
positive motions, and they often play an active role in settling cases.' 9
Even in those cases thatjuries decidejudges preside. They determine
what evidence juries will be allowed to hear and interpret and instruct
juries on the law they are to apply. Therefore, understanding judicial
decision making is the key to understanding the outcome of particu-
lar cases and the development of law. As Jerome Frank put it, ifjudi-
cial decisions are "based on judge's hunches, then the way in which
the judge gets his hunches is the key to the judicial process. Whatever
produces the judge's hunches makes the law."20
Despite the important role thatjudges play in the courtroom, psy-
chologists have focused their research efforts almost exclusively onju-
ries. Consequently, as several judges themselves have complained, few
systematic studies ofjudicial decision making exist.2 ' Most of the em-
son, Geoffrey T. Fong, & D. L Rosenhan, Inadmissible Evidnce and Juror Verd&cts, 40 J. PEn.
so .rw& Soc. PSvCHOL. 453, 457-62 (1981); Sharon Wolf & David A. Montgomery, Effects
of Inadmissible Evidence and Level ofJudicial Admonishment to Disregard on theJ udg rts of Moch
Jurors, 7J. APPUED Soc. PSvCHOL. 205, 212-16 (1977).
15 See Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You
Get: Anchoring in Personal Injuy Verdic, 10 As'LiED ComrrE PSyCttOL. 519, 525-28, 532-33
(1996); Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade, & John W. Payne, JurorJudgments in Citil Cases:
Effects of Plaintiffs Requests and Plaintiff's Identi4' on PunitiveDamageAwards 23 Lw & Ht: t.
BEHAv. 445, 463-65 (1999); Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for
Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Triad, 25J. APPUED SOC. PSndOL 991, 1009-10, 1016 (1995);
John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, ShapingJurorAttitudes Effects of RcquestingDifferent Damage
Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129J. Soc. PSaHoL. 491, 495 (1989); Allan Raitz, Edith
Greene, Jane Goodman, & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Determining Damages: The Influence of Evpt
Testimony on Jurors' Decision Making, 14 Lkw & Hu.st. BEHw. 385, 390-94 (1990); sce also
VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDIAR, JUDGING THEJvRY 80 (1986) (reporting an emperiment in
which a mock jury appeared extremely susceptible to a damage amount suggested by an
attorney).
16 See Cass R Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, & Da~id Schkade, Asn.ssingPuntit'e Dam-
ages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YA.E Uj. 2071, 210004 (1993).
17 See RONALD DwomuN, Lww's FmpRER 1 (1986) ("It matters how judges decide
cases").
18 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial By Jury or Judge: Transcending Em-
piricism, 77 CoRN.LL L Rxv. 1124, 1127 n.7 (1992); sce also LUoNm.s RuslP MEOXLt.%JUtDI
cL-%u BusINFESs OF THE UNrTED STATES COURTS: 1999 ANvAL REPorrr OF THE Dmincron 172-
74 tbLC-7 (1999).
19 Marc Galanter, Rel World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote 55 Mo. L RE%. 1093, 1100
n.17 (1996) (estimating that 7% of cases end in trials and 24% are decided on dispositive
motions). If half of the 7% of trials are jury trials, then juries decide 3.5% of all cases,
while 24% are decided on dispositive motions.
20 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 104 (1930) (emphasis added).
21 See, e.g.,JohnJ. Brunetti, Seardingfor Methods of Trial Court Fact-Finding and Dedsion-
Making, 49 HAsnNcs LJ. 1491, 1491 (1998) ("Like many newjudges, I try to read as much
2001]
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pirical work on judicial decision making has been motivated by con-
cerns that judges make decisions that are self-serving or politically
driven.2 2 Few have dealt with the sources ofjudicial error.23 As a re-
sult of the scarcity of research on the topic, even the most learned
judges have acknowledged that they do not understand how judges
make decisions. 24
Psychologists suspect that even though judges are experienced,
well-trained, and highly motivated decision makers, they are vulnera-
ble to cognitive illusions.25 Research on human judgment and choice
indirectly supports this suspicion. Empirical studies demonstrate that
cognitive illusions plague assessments that many professionals, includ-
ing doctors, real estate appraisers, engineers, accountants, options
as I can about the judicial process. I was disappointed to find that while much has been
written about judicial philosophies of famous appellate court judges and their modes of
decision making, little has been written about trial court fact-finding."); Donald C. Nugent,
Judicial Bias, 42 CL-V. ST. L. REv. 1, 4 (1994) (noting with surprise that "few studies analyze
the manner and method of thejudiciary's decision-making process"); Walter V. Schaefer,
Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHn. L. REv. 3, 23 (1966) (bemoaning the legal profession's lack
of "techniques and tools which are sensitive enough to explore the mind of man and re-
port accurately its conscious and subconscious operations"); AndrewJ. Wistrich, Ho Cogni.
live Illusions Can Affect Legal Decision Making, LinG. SEc. NEWsLU-r FOR THE Civ. TIAL
LAw., Fall 1999, at 2, 5 ("Very little research has been done regarding the susceptibility of
judges to cognitive illusions."). But seeJohn C. Anderson, D. Jordan Lowe, & Philip MJ.
Reckers, Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J.
ECON. PSYCHoLt 711, 725-27 (1993) (reporting a study ofjudges that tested for hindsight
bias); Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorey Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WAstI.
U. L.Q. 979, 982-89 (1994) (reporting the results of a study of the incidence of egocentric
bias among bankruptcy judges and lawyers); Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't
Do Welk The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 901, 904-08 (1998) (dis-
cussing the results of a study of the behavior ofjudges and mock jurors); Stephen Lands-
man & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information
on Judges andJuries in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAVIORAL Sci. & L. 113 (1994) (reporting results
of experiment suggesting thatjudges andjurors may be similarly influenced by exposure to
potentially biasing information);Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Punitive Damage Decision Making:
The Decisions of Citizens and Trial Court Judges, 25 LAW & Humf. BEHAV. (forthcoming 2001)
(reporting results of study comparing damage awards of jury-eligible citizens and trial
court judges); IV. Rip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk? 1 ANi. L. & EcoN. Rv, 26
(1999) (reporting results of a study ofjudges' biases); Roselle L. Wissler, AllenJ. Hart, &
Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and
Laryers, 98 MicH. L RErv. 751, 776, 786 (1999) (studying the factors that contribute to
judges' assessments of the severity of injuries and judges' awards for damages); Marianne
M.Jennings, D.Jordan Lowe, & Philip M.J. Reckers, Outcome Foreseeability and Its Effects
on Judicial Decisions (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (reporting a study of
the effects of hindsight bias on judges).
22 See BAUM, supra note 7, at 89-124 (reviewing studies of the strategy behind judicial
decision making); Sisk et al., supra note 6, at 1385-96 (reviewing empirical studies of the
influence ofjudges' race, sex, and political orientation onjudicial decision making).
23 The recent paper by Viscusi, supra note 21, is a notable exception.
24 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 466
(1897) (noting that the basis forjudicial decision making often "lies [in] inarticulate and
unconsciousjudgment"); Schaefer, supra note 21, at 22 (stating thatjudges "lack the ability
to describe what happens" when they make decisions).
25 See HANs & VmMAR, supra note 15, at 247-48.
782
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traders, military leaders, and psychologists, make.26 Even lawyers fall
prey to cognitive illusions.27 Inasmuch as "[]udging is choice,"28 the
conclusions drawn from psychological research on human judgment
and choice likely apply to judges as well." Furthermore, judges make
decisions under uncertain, time-pressured conditions that encourage
reliance on cognitive shortcuts that sometimes cause illusions ofjudg-
ment. Nevertheless, without empirical evidence, the assertion that
cognitive illusions affect judges remains mere conjecture.
26 See Anderson et al., supra note 21, at 725 (noting that professional auditors are
subject to the hindsight bias); Hal R. Arkes, David Faust, ThomasJ. Guilmette, & Kathleen
Hart, Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73J. APPIED PsrXmoL 305, 306 (1988) (demonstrating
that psychologists exhibit the hindsight bias); Hal R. Arkes, Robert L Wortmann, Paul D.
Saville, & Allan R. Harkness, Hindsight Bias Among Phsicians Weighing the Lihdlihood of Diag
noses, 66 J. APPLEn PSYCHOL 252, 253 (1981) (indicating that "physicians exhibited the
hindsight bias"); LorenJ. Chapman &Jean P. Chapman, llusoy Crrelation as an Obstacle to
the Use of Valid Psycwdiagnostic Signs, 74J. ABNoLM.. Psycot 271 (1969) (demonstrating
that various heuristics inspire erroneous beliefs in psychotherapists); Craig IL Fox, Brett A.
Rogers, & Amos Tversky, Options Traders Exhdbit Subadditive Dedsion fight, 13 J. RIsK &
UNCERTAIN-y 5, 16 (1996) (finding that option traders rely on heuristics in probabilistic
reasoning); Raanon Lipshitz & Dal)a Barak, Hindsight sdom: Outcome Knowledge and the
Evaluation of Derisions 88 AcrA PScHOLOGICA 105, 121-23 (1995) (demonstrating that of-
ficers in the Israeli defense forces commit the hindsight bias); Barbaraj. McNeil, Stephen
G. Pauker, Harold C. Sox, Jr., & Amos Tversky, On the Elcitation of Pteferences for Alternative
Therapies, 306 NEv ENG.J. MED. 1259, 1261-62 (1982) (finding that physicians are suscepti-
ble to framing effects); Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and
Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspehtie on Property Pdcing Deision 39 O ,\lz.
TroNAL BEHAV. & Hu~M. DECISION PRocEssEs 84, 9596 (1987) (reporting that real estate
agents fall prey to anchoring effects when estimating real estate prices); ste also Pt.oUS,
supra note 8, at 258 ("[S]everal studies have found that experts display either roughly the
same biases as college students or the same biases at somewhat reduced levels." (citations
omitted)).
27 See, e.g., Linda Babcock, Henry S. Farber, Cynthia Fobian, & Eldar Shafir, Forming
Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of RiUk and Reseration Values, 15 INer'L RE%. L &
EcoN. 289, 296-97 (1995) (finding that framing effects had a similar impact on laqer and
nonlaw er subjects); Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke, Lawyers Exhibit Subadditivity when
Forecasting Trial Outcomes (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (demonstrat-
ing that lawyers exhibit decision-making biases when assessing probabilities). But see Rus-
sell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, P'chology, Economics, and Settlenent: A New Lao! at the Roe of
the Lauyer, 76 Tmx. L Rav. 77, 99-101 (1997) (reporting that lawyers are less susceptible
than nonlawyers to framing effects); Darrin IL Lehman, Richard 0. Lempert, & Richard E.
Nisbett, TheEffects of Graduate Trainingon Reasoning, 43 Am. PS..HOL. 431,440 (1988) (find-
ing that training in psychology, medicine, and law can improve logical decision making).
28 KEETON, supra note 3, § 1.1.
29 See, e.g., MORIS R. COHEN, LXwV AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: Fsaws IN LEsIAL PHiLOSO-
rHY 337 (1933) (explaining that "we must not forget that actual law is a human product-
made and administered byjudges who are not free from human limitations in intelligence
and goodwill"); FRANY, supra note 20, at 100 (arguing that to understandjudicial decisions
"we must observe how ordinary men dealing with ordinary affairs arrive at their judg-
ments"); Robert M. Cover, Fom~ardw Nomos and Narrative, 97 I-,Rtv. L RE%. 4, 67 (1983)
(noting thatjudges are "like the rest of us"); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of $!pti-
cism, 86 MicH. L Rav. 827, 859 (1988) (noting that "(t] here is no distinctive methodology
of legal reasoning").
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To explore the influence of cognitive illusions on judicial deci-
sion making, we conducted an empirical study. In our study, we
sought to determine whether five common cognitive illusions influ-
ence the way judges make decisions using a sample of 167 federal
magistrate judges. We tested for the influence of: anchoring (making
estimates based on irrelevant starting points); framing (treating eco-
nomically equivalent gains and losses differently); hindsight bias (per-
ceiving past events to have been more predictable than they actually
were); the representativeness heuristic (ignoring important back-
ground statistical information in favor of individuating information);
and egocentric biases (overestimating one's own abilities). We found
that each of these cognitive illusions influenced the decision-making
processes of the judges in our study. Although the judges displayed
less vulnerability to two of the five illusions than other experts and
laypersons, the results demonstrate that under certain circumstances
judges rely on heuristics that can lead to systematically erroneous
judgments. In short, our study provides empirical support forJerome
Frank's assertion that "[w] hen all is said and done, we must face the
fact that judges are human."30
The results of our research raise questions for judges, litigants,
and the justice system as a whole. For example: what steps, if any, can
judges take to improve their decision making? Should they take these
steps? Does judicial susceptibility to cognitive illusions affect the opti-
mal allocation of decision-making responsibility between judges and
juries? Should courts or legislatures adopt rules of civil procedure,
rules of evidence, or substantive legal standards designed to minimize
the adverse effects of cognitive illusions on the quality ofjudicial deci-
sion making? Have they done so already?
After describing our methodology in Part I and presenting our
results in Part II, we explore these questions in Part III. We conclude
on a hopeful note. Although the evidence we present indicates that
judges commit predictable errors of judgment, we are optimistic that
judges, litigants, and legislatures can take steps-and in some in-





We recruited 167 federal magistrate judges to participate in our
study. Congress created the modern office of the federal magistrate
30 FRANK, supra note 4, at 410.
[Vol. 86:777
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judge when it enacted the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968.31 Al-
though the role that magistrate judges play varies from district to dis-
trict, they perform many (although not all) of the functions federal
district judges perform.3 2 Over the years, Congress has steadily in-
creased the responsibilities that magistrate judges may undertake,
which now include the power to conduct civil trials with the litigants'
consent.33 In 1999, the 519 federal magistrate judges handled
282,933 preliminary criminal proceedings,34 63,931 civil pre-trial con-
ferences,3 5 and entered final judgment in 11,320 cases litigated by
consent in front of magistrate judges (approximately 1500 of which
resulted in trials).36
Federal magistrate judges are selected by a careful appointment
process designed to be based on merit. To obtain eight-year, renewa-
ble appointments, candidates for federal magistrate judgeships are
evaluated by "merit selection panels" charged with "identifying and
recommending persons who are best qualified to fill such positions."3 7
Based on these recommendations, the district judges in the relevant
district vote for their preferred applicant ass The appointment process
reflects an effort to identify and appoint skilled decision makers.
Although the entire sample of judges who graciously agreed to
participate in our study were federal magistrate judges, we do not be-
lieve that our results are in any way unique to this group. Like other
state and federal judges, magistrate judges typically enjoyed successful
careers in law practice. Some have had priorjudicial experience. Our
sample was drawn from a large group of magistrate judges attending
31 Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1994)).
32 See R. Lawrence Dessem, The Role of the Federal MagistrateJudge in Cidl Justice Reform,
67 ST.JoHN'S L REv. 799, 834 (1993). For more background on federal magistrate judges,
see generally CARROLL SERON, THE RoLEs OF NIAGISTRATES iN FEDEvL Dis'arar Cotirrs
(1983) (reporting survey results documenting the work performed by magistrates); GC.r.
ROLL SERON, THE RoLEs OF MAGIS-mES: NINE CASE ST'rDIEs (1985) (describing several
different approaches to the use of magistrate judges); CHISTOPHER E. Slrmi, U".rnrm
STATES M.AGISTRATEs rN THE FEDERAL CouRTs: SUBORDIN.TEJvDGES (1990) (providing an
empirical analysis of the role of magistratejudges). However, there are functions reserved
exclusively to federal districtjudges-most notably, conducting felony criminal trials.
33 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994 & Supp. R1 1998); FEo. L CIv. Paoc. 73. More recently.
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, further expanded the power Federal Magistrates
Judges enjoy. Pub. L No. 101-650, tit. 1, 104 Stat. 5089, 5090-93 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 471473 (1994)); see Dessem, supra note 32, at 811-32 (exploring the impact of
the Civil Justice Reform Act on the use of magistrate judges); Philip M. Pro & Thomas C.
Hnatouski, Measured Progress: The Evolution and Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges
System, 44 A.,s. U. L Rxv. 1503, 1520-22 (1995) (describing the increased role of magistrate
judges in the wake of the CivilJustice Reform Act).
34 MECHAM, supra note 18, at 351 thl.M-3.
35 Id. at 357 tbl.M-4A.
36 Id. at 360 tbl.M-5.
37 28 U.S.C. § 631(b) (5).
38 28 U.S.C. § 631(a).
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an educational conference, who had no special interest in psychology
or psychological research. Additionally, a handful of other studies
have shown that cognitive illusions affect judges of all kinds.39
B. Procedure
The magistrate judges who participated in our study did so as
part of the Federal Judicial Center's Workshop for Magistrate Judges
II in New Orleans in November 1999. At this workshop, we presented
the opening panel, entitled "Psychology of Judging." Before begin-
ning our panel presentation, we randomly distributed differing ver-
sions of a five-page questionnaire to the judges in attendance.40 We
asked the judges to read the questionnaire, to respond to each of the
questions, and to refrain from discussing the questionnaire until after
we retrieved the completed questionnaires from all of the partici-
pants. We did not ask the judges to identify themselves on the ques-
tionnaire, so all responses were anonymous.
The five-page questionnaire began with a paragraph-long set of
instructions. In it, we asked the judges to read and respond to the
questions independently, informed the judges that participation in
the study was voluntary, and explained that we intended to use the
aggregate responses to illustrate points during our presentation. 41 On
the subsequent pages, the questionnaire presented each judge with
five items, consisting of a background description and one or more
questions. Each item tested for the influence of one of the five cogni-
tive illusions described below.4 2 To create controlled experimental
conditions, we devised multiple variations of three of the items tested
(though the first page of the questionnaire gave no indication of
this) .43
39 See studies cited infra note 201.
40 The Psychology ofJudging, questionnaire from the Federal Judicial Center Work-
shop for Untied States Judges II (Nov. 9, 1999) (on file with authors).
41 Under the boldface heading, "Workshop for U.S. Magistrate Judges, The Psychol-
ogy of Judging, Judicial Survey," we provided the following instructions:
Many of the points discussed by this panel are best understood if exper-
ienced directly. We therefore ask that before the session starts, you read
and respond to each of the questions enclosed in this survey (although do-
ing so is voluntary, of course). Please do so independently and please do not
discuss the surveys with others while you are responding to the questions. We shall
collect these surveys before the discussion and present the results during
the panel session.
42 See infra Part II.
43 The items designed to test for framing effects and anchoring each consisted of two
different conditions, and the item designed to test for the hindsight bias consisted of three
different conditions. The other two items were uniform. All twelve possible combinations
of the three variable items were created. Thus, judges received one of the twelve different
questionnaires. The order of the items was also uniform.
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The fifth and final page of the questionnaire gave the judges the
opportunity to choose to limit the use of their answers to the educa-
tional workshop, excluding them from further analysis or publica-
tion.44 One judge out of the 168 who returned questionnaires chose
to exercise this option, so we removed that questionnaire from consid-
eration in this Article, leaving a sample of 167 judges.
Completing the questionnaire took approximately ten minutes.
During its administration, the judges remained in the room, kept si-
lent, and appeared to take the process seriously. We have no way of
knowing for sure how many, if any, of the judges refused to return
their questionnaires, but we believe most of the judges in attendance
completed them and turned them in. The room, which was nearly
full, seated a maximum of two hundred persons. In all, the sample of
167judges comprised nearly one-third of the 519 federal magistrate
judges on the bench at the time.45
1I
RESULTS
We designed the questionnaires to assess the influence of the fol-
lowing five common cognitive illusions on judicial decision making:
anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic,
and egocentric biases. These illusions are among the most well docu-
mented in the psychological literature on judgment and choice and
they have been shown to affect litigants, lawyers, and the legal system
as a whole. We found that these cognitive illusions also affect the legal
system's most important and powerful actors: judges.
A. Anchoring
When people make numerical estimates (e.g., the fair market
value of a house), they commonly rely on the initial value a%ailable to
them (e.g., the list price). That initial value tends to "anchor" their
44 The text on the last page read as follows:
Please note: This survey is designed to illustrate the psychological phenom-
ena being discussed by this panel. The panelists will present aggregate re-
sults during the discussion. The panelists, however, would also like the
opportunity to comment respectfully on the aggregate results of this survey
at other public presentations and possibly in published works. In no way
will individual participants be identified as part of any discussion of the
results of this survey. (Identifying information is not even being collected.)
If, for any reason, you object to the use of the results of this survey in any
forum other than the present panel, please indicate so by circling this para-
graph and your survey will be removed from any further analysis or
discussion.
45 MEcHAM, supra note 18, at 44 (reporting that in the fall of 1999, there were 65 part-
time and 454 full-time federal magistrate judges).
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final estimates. 46 In many situations, reliance on an anchor is reasona-
ble because many anchors convey relevant information about the ac-
tual value of an item (although people might rely too heavily on
anchors). The problem, however, is that anchors that do not provide
any information about the actual value of an item also influence
judgment.
In one early study of anchoring, Professors Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman asked participants to estimate the percentage of Af-
rican countries in the United Nations.47 Before asking for this esti-
mate, they informed the participants that the number was either
higher or lower than a numerical value identified by the spin of a
"wheel of fortune."48 Tversky and Kahneman had secretly rigged this
"wheel of fortune" to stop either on ten or sixty-five. 49 When the
wheel landed on ten, participants provided a median estimate of 25%;
when the wheel landed on sixty-five, participants provided a median
estimate of 45%.50 Even though the initial values were clearly irrele-
vant to the correct answer, the initial values had a pronounced impact
on the participants' responses. 51
Anchors affect judgment by changing the standard of reference
that people use when making numeric judgments. Anchors induce
people to consider seriously the possibility that the real value is similar
to the anchor, thereby leading them to envision circumstances under
which the anchor would be correct.52 Even when people conclude
that an anchor provides no useful information, mentally testing the
validity of the anchor causes people to adjust their estimates upward
or downward toward that anchor. As a consequence, even extreme,
wholly absurd anchors can affect judgment. For example, students
provided higher estimates of the average price of a college textbook
when they were first asked to determine whether it was higher or
lower than $7128.53.53 This anchor, although ridiculously high,
forces students to consider the possibility that textbook pricetags are
higher than they might have otherwise believed. Similarly, people
provided higher estimates of the average annual temperature in San
Francisco when first asked to determine whether it was higher or
46 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 8, at 1128-30 (defining and explaining anchoring
effects).




51 Tversky and Kahneman also used other number pairs and asked subjects to esti-
mate other quantities in this "wheel of fortune" experiment. Id.
52 Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: Mecha.
nisms of Selective Accessibility, 73J. PERSONAUrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 437, 437-39 (1997).
53 PLous, supra note 8, at 146 (referring to an unpublished study by George Quat-
trone and colleagues).
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lower than 558 degrees. 5 4 Such a high anchor induces people to con-
sider the possibility that the real average is quite high.
Litigation frequently produces anchors. 55 In settlement talks, for
instance, litigants can be influenced by the opening offers that their
adversaries make. Professors Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie
found that people evaluating hypothetical settlement offers were
more likely to accept a $12,000 final settlement offer when it followed
a $2000 opening offer than when it followed a $10,000 opening of-
fer.56 Korobkin and Guthrie hypothesized that those who received
the $2000 opening offer expected to settle for a relatively small
amount, so the $12,000 final offer seemed generous by comparison.57
On the other hand, those who received the $10,000 opening offer
expected to settle for relatively more, so the $12,000 final offer
seemed relatively stingy.58 The opening offers effectively "anchored
subjects' expectations" and influenced their settlement preferences.5 9
Legal scholars have long thought that anchors influence jurors.60
In five separate studies, researchers have found that plaintiffs' lawyers'
damage requests influenced mock jurors' assessments of the appropri-
ate amount of damages to award in civil suits.61 In one study, for in-
stance, mock jurors awarded slightly more than $90,000 when the
plaintiff's lawyer requested $100,000 in damages; but when the plain-
tiff's lawyer requested $500,000 in damages in the very same case,
mock jurors awarded nearly $300,000.62 Even silly and outrageous
damage requests can influence juror decision making. For example,
mock jurors in another study awarded the plaintiff substantially more
in damages when the plaintiffs lawyer requested an outlandish $1 bil-
lion than when the plaintiff's lawyer requested a more plausible
amount.63 The moral of these anchoring studies seems to be, "Ask
54 _T&
55 See generally ,istrich, supra note 21 (describing the impact anchoring can have in
the courtroom).
56 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Slement: A Little




60 See Dale W. Broeder, The Universiy of CagoJiny Project, 38 NED. L RE%. 744, 756
(1959) (reporting that interviews conducted with jurors revealed that plaintiffs damage
requests anchored juror damage determinations in six of seven cases).
61 See Chapman & Bornstein, supra note 15, at 526-27; Hastie et al., supra note 15, at
463; Hinsz & Indahl, supra note 15, at 1009; Malouff & Schutte, supra note 15, at 495; Raitz
et al., supra note 15, at 393.
62 Malouff & Schutte, supra note 15, at 495 tbl.1.
63 Chapman & Bornstein, supra note 15, at 525-26.
20011 789
HeinOnline  -- 86 Cornell L. Rev. 789 2000-2001
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and ye shall receive." In each, "when more money was requested for
damages by the plaintiff's attorney, the jurors awarded more."' 1t
Recognition of the potentially pernicious effect of anchoring on
damage awards has triggered calls for reform.65 Some of these reform
efforts have included suggestions to replace juries with judges, 6 pre-
sumably on the theory that judges will be immune from anchoring
effects. Indeed, because experience can mitigate the influence of arbi-
trary anchors, 67 there is reason to believe that this presumption might
be accurate.
1. Anchoring Our Materials
To test whether judges' damage determinations might be influ-
enced by anchoring effects, we presented each of the judges with the
following description of a serious personal injury suit in which only
damages were at issue:
Suppose that you are presiding over a personal injury lawsuit
that is in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The defen-
dant is a major company in the package delivery business. The
plaintiff was badly injured after being struck by one of the defen-
dant's trucks when its brakes failed at a traffic light. Subsequent
investigations revealed that the braking system on the truck was
faulty, and that the truck had not been properly maintained by the
defendant. The plaintiff was hospitalized for several months, and
has been in a wheelchair ever since, unable to use his legs. He had
been earning a good living as a free-lance electrician and had built
up a steady base of loyal customers. The plaintiff has requested
damages for lost wages, hospitalization, and pain and suffering, but
has not specified an amount. Both parties have waived their rights
to ajury trial.
We randomly assigned the judges to either a "No Anchor" condi-
tion or an "Anchor" condition. We provided judges in the No Anchor
group with the paragraph above and asked them, "how much would
64 Malouff & Schutte, supra note 15, at 495. Researchers have found not only that the
plaintiff's requests for damages can anchor jurors but also that statutory damage caps can
anchorjurors. See, e.g., Hinsz & Indahl, supra note 15, at 1001-06; Jennifer I& Robbennolt
& Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages,
23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 361 (1999). Statutory damage caps can also lead to anchoring
and adjustment effects in settlement. See, e.g., Linda Babcock & Greg Pogarsky, Damage
Caps and Settlement: A BehavioralApproach, 28 J. LzEaiL STUD. 341, 362-68 (1999).
65 Sunstein et al., supra note 16, at 2109-30 (explaining the susceptibility ofjuries to
anchoring effects and suggesting reforms).
66 Id. at 2127 (finding that of the proposed reforms, an "incremental shift from jury
to judicial determinations of punitive damages appears to be the most promising").
67 See Clark McCauley, Margo Durham, John B. Copley, &John P. Johnson, Patients'
Perceptions of Treatmentfor Kidney Failure: The Impact of Personal Experience on Population Predic'
tions, 21 J. EXPERIMENrAL SOC. PSYCHOL 138, 141-44 (1985) (demonstrating that people
rely on anchors derived from personal experience).
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you award the plaintiff in compensatory damages?" We provided the
judges in the Anchor condition with the same information. In addi-
tion, we informed the subjects in the Anchor condition that "[t]he
defendant has moved for dismissal of the case, arguing that it does not
meet the jurisdictional minimum for a diversity case of S75,000."6
We asked these judges to rule on the motion, and then asked them
"[i]f you deny the motion, how much would you award the plaintiff in
compensatory damages?" Because the plaintiff clearly had incurred
damages greater than $75,000, the motion was meritless. Neverthe-
less, we hypothesized that the $75,000 would serve as an anchor, re-
sulting in lower damage awards from those judges who first ruled on
the motion.
2. Anchoring: Results
Ruling on the motion had a large effect on damage awards. The
sixty-six judges in the No Anchor condition indicated that they would
award plaintiff an average of $1,249,000 while the fifty judges in the
Anchor condition awarded an average of $882,000.69 The difference
between the two groups was statistically significant.70
Only two (2.3%) of the judges in the Anchor condition granted
the motion to dismiss.71 By voting overwhelmingly to deny the motion
to dismiss, the judges indicated that the $75,000 jurisdictional mini-
68 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing that in diversity cases, the
federal district courts "have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000").
69 The response rate differed between the two conditions. Excluding the twojudges
who granted the motion, 31.1% (or 51 out of 164) of the judges declined to answer the
question, many citing a lack of adequate information. Without the preliminary motion,
only 17.5% (14 of the 80 who did not rule on the motion) of thejudges failed to provide
an estimate, but of those judges asked to rule on the motion first, 44% (37 of the 84judges
that denied the motion) declined to answer. The difference in response rate i s signifi-
cant. z = 3.43, p < .001. How this difference might have affected tie resultis (or 1-hy it
occurred) is unclear.
Throughout this Article, we reserve the term "significant" or "significance to denote
the statistical rejection of the null hypothesis that two variables are not related at a
probability of 5% or less. SeeWiu.Lts L Rms, STATISTICS 230-66 (3d ed. 1981) (exnplaining
the logic of statistical hypothesis testing). In all cases, wve report the p-value, which is the
measure of the likelihood that the null hypothesis can be correctly rejected. We use the
following four different statistical tests in this Article: Fisher's exact test for measures of
association between two binary ariables, as reported with the --score, see id. at 552-54; the t-
test for differences between two parametric samples, as reported with the tstatistic, see id. at
271-300; the Mann-Whimey test for differences between two nonparametric samples, as
reported with the Mann-Whitney U (adjusted for ties in all cases), see id. at 587-89; and the
x test for different distributions of categorical data, as reported with the x2 square statistic,
see idz at 305-13.
70 t(113) = 2.18, p = .031.
71 One of these two judges asserted that they wanted the plaintiff to amend the com-
plaint to specify an amount. One of the 87 judges in the Anchor condition did not re-
spond to the question about the motion, citing insufficient information.
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mum contained no reliable information regarding the plaintiff's dam-
ages. Nonetheless, the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum anchored
their damage awards. In this hypothetical case, asking the judges to
rule on this frivlous motion depressed average damage awards by
more than $350,000 (or 29.4%).
Like most damage-award data, our results were positively skewed;
most awards were low, but a small number of awards were markedly
higher than the rest. Because such skewed results can render mean
results unreliable, we report the median and quartile statistics in Ta-
ble 1:72
TABLE 1: ANCHORING: QuARTiLE RESULTS
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3d Quartile
Condition (25th percentile) (median) (75th percentile)
No Anchor $500,000 $1,000,000 $1,925,000
Anchor $288,000 $882,000 $1,000,000
The motion had a pronounced effect on the judges at all response
levels. At the first and third quartiles, for example, judges assigned to
the Anchor condition awarded roughly half the damages awarded by
judges assigned to the No Anchor condition (i.e., $288,000 vs.
$500,000 and $1 million vs. $1.925 million). Also, three-quarters of
the judges in the Anchor condition awarded damages that were lower
than half of those awarded by the judges in the No Anchor condition.
3. Anchoring: Discussion
The judges in our study relied on an anchor-the $75,000 juris-
dictional minimum raised by the motion to dismiss-to estimate dam-
age awards in a hypothetical personal-injury case. Ruling on this
motion might have caused the judges to consider the possibility that
the true damages in this case were exceptionally low. If so, the judges
would have been thinking about cases in which the maximum awards
are quite low when they made their damage estimates. Consequently,
they might have mentally filled in the factual gaps in our hypothetical
with details that would have made an award greater than $75,000 im-
plausible, thereby producing comparatively low damage estimates. A
process like this would be consistent with the research on how anchor-
ing works.
Alternatively, judges in our study might have believed that the
anchor signaled relevant information. They might, for example, have
72 A non-parametric test (more appropriate to positively skewed data such as ours)
also revealed that the damage estimates in the two conditions differed significantly. Mann-
Whitney, U= 4216.5, p = .048.
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reasoned that a defendant would have been more inclined to file such
a motion in a case where the damages were actually low. (The oppo-
site inference might, in fact, be more plausible, inasmuch as frivolous
motions are usually designed to delay an adverse outcome, such as a
high damage award.) If the judges believed this, then it might have
been reasonable for them to infer from the motion that the defendant
believed that the damages were low. The psychological literature on
anchoring, however, combined with the magnitude of the difference
between the Anchor and No Anchor groups in our study, suggests that
anchoring provides a better account of our results than does this alter-
native explanation.
The susceptibility ofjudges to anchoring effects does not suggest
that defendants should file motions to dismiss for lack of subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction as a way of anchoring judges in actual cases. Not only
are frivolous motions subject to sanctions,73 but these motions would
not necessarily anchor judges in actual cases. In an actual case, the
judge would dispose of this type of a motion long before awarding
damages. This temporal separation of the motion from the determi-
nation of the damage award would dull any anchoring effect the mo-
tion might otherwise have. Furthermore, several other anchors would
likely be available at trial. Although we do not entirely discount the
possible effects that such motions might have on judicial thought
processes, we recognize that many other factors might affect the
outcome.
Rather than suggesting a disingenuous litigation strategy, these
data show how easily anchors can creep into the process and affect the
way judges think about damage awards. Commentators have worried
about the effects of plaintiffs' damage requests on juries,7" but our
data suggest that these damage requests might also affectjudges. The
potential for statutory damage caps to anchor judges is equally troub-
ling. Judges might be able to keep juries ignorant of damage caps,75
but they obviously cannot blind themselves to the caps. Ironically,
then, the best way to prevent a statutory damage cap from anchoring a
damage award might be to vest that decision-making power in a jury
that is ignorant of the cap.
The potentially pernicious effects of anchoring also suggest a
source of error in both the civil and criminal justice systems. In civil
cases, the influence on judges of misleading anchors, such as litigants'
73 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (authorizing fee and cost shifting against litigants 'ho
unreasonably multiply proceedings); FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (pro\iding for sanctions against
parties who file frivolous motions).
74 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
75 It is also possible, however, that jurors might be aare of-or, even worse, mis-
informed about-a damage cap.
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requests for damage awards, can produce biased damage awards. In
criminal cases, the influence on judges of biased or misleading
anchors, such as prosecutor or defense attorney sentencing recom-
mendations, can produce biased criminal sentences. In both cases,
constraints, such as damage caps or mandatory sentencing guidelines,
might reduce the influence that biased or irrelevant anchors can have
on judicial damage awards and sentences. For example, criminal sen-
tencing guidelines that constrain the range of available sentences
based on factors such as a defendant's criminal conduct will provide
stable, unbiased anchors. Instead of the potentially biased recommen-
dations from attorneys, the sentencing guidelines will provide judges
with a neutral source of anchors. Although judges may bristle at the
constraint on their discretion that sentencing guidelines impose,
these guidelines reduce the influence of potentially biased anchors.
Sentencing guidelines (and damage caps), however, can also inappro-
priately skew criminal sentences (and damage awards) if they provide
anchors that are unrelated to an appropriate sentence (and damage
award).
B. Framing
When people confront risky decisions-such as deciding whether
to settle a case or to proceed to trial-they categorize their decision
options as potential gains or losses from a salient reference point such
as the status quo.76 This categorization, or "framing," of decision op-
tions influences the way people evaluate options and affects their will-
ingness to incur risk. People tend to make risk-averse decisions when
choosing between options that appear to represent gains and risk-
seeking decisions when choosing between options that appear to re-
present losses.77 For example, most people prefer a certain $100 gain
to a 50% chance of winning $200 but prefer a 50% chance of losing
$200 to a certain $100 loss. 78
76 See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 Am.
PSYCHOLOGIsr 341 (1984) (discussing the psychological phenomenon of framing); Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risl; 47
ECONOMEMncA 263 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory] (same);
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211
SCIENCE 453 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Framing of Decisions] (same); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251
(1986) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice] (same).
77 See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 76, at 34244,
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 76, at 268-69; Tversky & Kahneman, Fram.
ing of Decisions, supra note 76, at 453-55; Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note
76, at S257-60.
78 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Repre-
sentation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RisK & UNcERTAINTY 297, 308 tbl.4 (1992).
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From a rational-choice perspective, people's risk preferences
should depend upon their wealth relative to the size of the stakes in-
volved.79 In practice, however, people tend not to make such norma-
tively appropriate calculations. Instead, people make choices
designed to maintain or slightly improve the status quo, which trans-
lates into risk-averse choices for most gains and risk-seeking choices
for most losses.80
Framing can have a profound impact on civil lawsuits because liti-
gation produces a natural frame.8 1 In most lawsuits, plaintiffs choose
either to accept a certain settlement from the defendant or to gamble,
hoping that further litigation will produce a larger gain. Most defend-
ants, by contrast, choose either to pay a certain settlement to the
plaintiff or to gamble that further litigation will reduce the amount
that they must pay. Thus, plaintiffs often choose between options that
appear to represent gains, while defendants often choose between op-
tions that appear to represent losses. As such, plaintiffs are more
likely to prefer settlement, the risk-averse option, while defendants are
more likely to prefer trial, the risk-seeking option.32
To demonstrate this phenomenon,Jeffrey Rachlinski presented a
simple litigation problem to law students, half of whom played the
role of plaintiff and half of whom played the role of defendant.8 3
Plaintiff-subjects faced a choice between a certain $200,000 settlement
offer and a 50% chance of winning $400,000 at trial (and a corre-
sponding 50% chance of winning nothing), while defendant-subjects
faced a choice between paying a $200,000 settlement to plaintiff and
facing a 50% chance of losing $400,000 at trial (and a 50% chance of
losing nothing).84 Rachlinski found that 77% of plaintiff-subjects
(choosing between gains), but only 31% of defendant-subjects (choos-
ing between losses), preferred settlementt5 Rachlinski and others
have generated additional experimental data demonstrating these
79 John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Coflicts 2J. LEc. STvD. 279, 279-80 (1973).
80 Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choie, supra note 76, at S257-60.
81 JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and thePdjo1g of Litigation, 70 S. u.. L RE.
113, 129 (1996).
82 In frivolous or low-probability litigation, by contrast, litigants' risk preferences are
reversed. See Chris Guthrie, FramingFrivolous Litigation: A Ps'dologiral Thcoa, 67 U. CI. L
Ray. 163, 185-95 (2000). In frivolous cases, plaintiffs typically choose between options that
appear to represent lo-probability gains, while defendants choose between options that ap-
pear to represent low-probability losses. Id. at 187. Decision makers selecting between low-
probability gains tend to make risk-seeking choices, while those selecting between low-
probability losses tend to make risk-averse choices. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note
78, at 306. Thus, in frivolous or low-probability litigation, plaintiffs are relatively more
inclined to go to trial than are defendants. Guthrie, supra, at 187.
83 Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 128-29.
84 Id. at 128.
85 Id. at 128-29.
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framing effects, 86 and Rachlinski has also found evidence of framing
effects among litigants in real cases.8 7 Taken together, this work pro-
vides powerful support for the proposition that plaintiffs are generally
more likely than defendants to find settlement attractive because of
the way litigants frame their decision options.88
1. Framing: Our Materials
Judges, of course, are neither plaintiffs nor defendants in the typ-
ical civil suit, but they often play an active role in supervising settle-
ment talks. Does framing lead judges to perceive the settlement
decisions of plaintiffs and defendants differently? To determine
whether framing might impact judges' settlement recommendations,
we presented each of the judges with a hypothetical fact pattern la-
beled "Suit and Settlement." This item included, for all judges, the
following description of a lawsuit:
Imagine that you are presiding over a case in which a plaintiff
has sued a defendant for $200,000 in a copyright action. Both the
plaintiff and the defendant are mid-sized publishing companies
with annual revenues of about $2.5 million per year. They are rep-
resented by competent attorneys who have not tried cases before
you in the past. You believe that the case is a simple one, but it
presents some tough factual questions. There is no dispute as to the
amount at stake, only as to whether the defendant's actions in-
fringed on the plaintiffs copyright. You believe that the plaintiff
has a 50% chance of recovering the full $200,000 and a 50% chance
of recovering $0. You expect that should the parties fail to settle,
each will spend approximately $50,000 at trial in litigation expenses.
Assume that there is no chance that the losing party at trial will have
to compensate the winner for these expenses.
In the second paragraph of this item, the judges learned that,
"[t] he case is approaching a trial date and you have scheduled a settle-
ment conference." Half of the judges ("Plaintiff/Gains" condition)
reviewed the case from the plaintiff's perspective, in which the choices
involved potential gains. These judges read the following: "You have
learned that the defendant intends to offer to pay the plaintiff
$60,000 to settle the case. Do you believe that the plaintiff should be
86 Id. at 135-44. For similar research, see Babcock et a., supra note 27, at 296-97;
Robin M. Hogarth, Ambiguity and Competitive Decision Making: Some Implications and Tests, 19
ANNALs OPERATIONS REs. 31, 40-41 (1989); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological
Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. Rev. 107, 30-42 (1994);
Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 27, at 96-101; PeterJ. van Koppen, Risk Taking in Civil Law
Negotiations, 14 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 151, 158-64 (1990).
87 Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 150-60.
88 But see Guthrie, supra note 82, at 185-95 (discussing experiments demonstrating
that plaintiffs are more likely than defendants to resist settlement in frivolous or low-
probability cases).
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willing to accept $60,000 to settle the case?" Thus, the judges learned
that the plaintiff faced a choice between a certain $60,000 gain or an
expected trial outcome of $50,000 (i.e., 50% x $200,000 judgment +
50% x $0 judgment - $50,000 attorney's fees = $50,000).
The other half of the judges ("Defendant/Losses" condition) re-
viewed the case from the defendant's perspective, in which the
choices involved potential losses. These judges read the follouing.
"You have learned that the plaintiff intends to offer to accept
$140,000 to settle the case. Do you believe that the defendant should
be willing to pay $140,000 to settle the case?" Thus, the judges as-
signed to this condition learned that the defendant faced a choice
between a certain $140,000 loss or an expected trial outcome of -
$150,000 (i.e., 50% x - $200,000 judgment + 50% x $0 judgment -
$50,000 attorney's fees = -$150,000). All judges were then asked to
circle "Yes"or "No."
We presented judges in both conditions with economically identi-
cal choices to evaluate. In a copyright dispute like this one, the judge
must decide who owns a sum of money generated by a piece of intel-
lectual property. Settling this sort of dispute requires the judge to
help the parties decide how to divide that fixed pie. Regardless of
whether they were assigned to the plaintiff or to the defendant
frames, the judges assessed a litigant confronted with a choice be-
tween obtaining $60,000 of the earnings for sure, or a gamble with an
expected value of only $50,000. The only difference between the two
conditionswas the status quo, that is, which party held the $200,000
sum at the outset of the lawsuit.
2. Framing: Results
The results varied by frame. Among the judges evaluating the
case from the plaintiff's perspective, 39.8% (thirty-three out of eighty-
three) indicated that they thought the plaintiff should accept the
$60,000 settlement offer, but only 25% (tventy out of eighty) of the
judges evaluating the case from the defendant's perspective indicated
that they thought the defendant should pay the $140,000 settlement
payment proposed by plaintiff.8 9 The difference between these two
groups was statistically significant. 90 Thus, like litigants, judges appear
to be influenced by the way decision problems are framed.
3. Framing- Discussion
The framing of the settlement decision affected judges in our
study. Although the hypothetical litigants in this problem faced settle-
89 Four judges (two in each condition) out of 167 (2.4%) declined to respond.
90 z = 1.99, p = .047.
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ment offers that were identical in terms of their expected value, the
materials created the illusion that the plaintiff faced a choice between
potential gains and that the defendant faced a choice between poten-
tial losses. From the plaintiff's perspective, settlement seemed rela-
tively more attractive, while from the defendant's perspective, trial
seemed relatively more attractive, even though the two perspectives
presented identical economic choices.
Framing can detrimentally impact judicial management of law-
suits. Judges, who frequently serve as mediators during conferences,
have the power to influence the settlement process. 91 If framing af-
fects judges' assessments of which party should make greater conces-
sions to settle a case, then framing favors defendants. Even though
the data on settlement show that defendants seem most resistant to
settlement and would thus benefit most from judicial encouragement
to settle,92 the data in our study suggest that judges are likely to lean
more heavily on plaintiffs than on defendants. By urging plaintiffs to
accept less than is appropriate or by failing to urge defendants to pay
an appropriate amount, judges might settle fewer cases than they oth-
erwise would or might promote settlements that undercompensate
plaintiffs and underdeter defendants.
Framing also has influenced the development of legal doctrine.9-9
When ownership of a commodity is in doubt, the courts traditionally
favor those who hold possession of the good-even when possession is
arbitrary.94 For example, if a seller contracts to sell a car to two differ-
ent buyers, courts will often award permanent ownership to the party
holding possession at the time the suit is brought.95 Several areas of
law, in fact, create similarly arbitrary distinctions between gains and
losses. 96 While these distinctions might be inconsistent with an eco-
nomic approach they are consistent with framing effects. The judges
who created the rules giving rise to these disparities may have done so
out of an implicit belief that gains should be treated differently from
losses.
Interestingly, apart from framing effects, a majority of the judges
(67.5%, or 110 out of 163) felt that the parties should decline to set-
tle, despite the fact that settlement offers from both the plaintiffs and
defendant's perspectives exceeded the expected value of trial. This
unexpected result might indicate that judges are relatively more risk-
91 See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 2, at 386-402 (illustrating situations in
which judges might influence litigation).
92 Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 159-60.
93 See David Cohen &Jack L. Knetsch, Judicial Choice and Disparities Between Measures of
Economic Values, 30 OsGoODE HAL. LJ. 737, 749-69 (1992).
94 See id. at 738.
95 Id. at 738-39.
96 See, e.g., id. at 751-69.
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seeking (or trial-seeking) than others. We suspect, however, that an-
other psychological explanation accounts for this finding. Although it
is true that the settlement offers exceeded the expected benefits of
litigation for both parties, they also represented only a fraction of the
potential settlement value available.9 7 For either party, accepting the
settlement would effectively concede 70% of the property's value to
the opposing party.98 Because the facts suggest that each party has an
equivalent claim to the property, the judges may have felt that an even
split was more appropriate. In experiments in which participants
must arbitrarily split a fixed pie, researchers have consistently found
that people consider anything other than an equal split unfair.99
Judges in our study responded much like participants in these studies.
This result suggests that litigants trying to negotiate a settlement with
the assistance of a mediator should justify their settlement proposals
in terms of fairness not merely economic rationality.
C. Hindsight Bias
Hindsight vision is 20/20. People overstate their own ability to
have predicted the past and believe that others should have been able
to predict events better than was possible.100 Psychologists call this
tendency for people to overestimate the predictability of past events
the "hindsight bias."10 1 It occurs because learning an outcome causes
people to update their beliefs about the world.102 People then rely on
these new beliefs to generate estimates of what was predictable, but
they ignore the change in their beliefs that learning the outcome
inspired.1 03
97 As discussed above, risk-neutral defendants should have been willing to settle for
any amount less than $150,000; risk-neutral plaintiffs should have been willing to settle for
any amount greater than $50,000. The attorney's fees of $50,000 for each side effectively
create a bargaining window of between $50,000 and $150,000. The $60,000 offer to the
plaintiff thus represents one tenth of the bargaining wrindow, as does the $140,000 offer for
the defendant.
98 If the plaintiffaccepts defendant's $60,000 offer, the defendant will retain $140,000
of the $200,000 in dispute (i.e., 70%). If the defendant agrees to pay plaintiff $140,000,
the plaintiff will obtain $140,000 of the $200,000 in dispute (i.e., 70%).
99 See generaly Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners,
J. EcoN. PmRsp., Spring 1995, at 209 (describing this research).
100 Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hind-
sighg in JUDGMiENT Umcoan UNcERTAINT. Ha IURtCS ,No BIAsEs 335, 341 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
101 StephenJ. Hoch & George F. Loewenstein, OutcomeFerdbach Hindsight and Informa-
tion, 15 J. Expmi aus ',L PSyCHOL.: L.ARiNGo MEmoRy & Cot.\moN 605, 605 (1989); see
also Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight+ # Foresight: The Effet of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertaint, 1 J. ExPERimENTAL PsiAmoL.: HuM. PEucEvnoxs & PEOR.o ntLcE 288 (1975)
(first documenting the effects of hindsight on judgment empirically).
102 See Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: BiasedJudgments of Past Events After the
Outcomes Are Known, 107 PsYCHOL. BULL. 311, 312-13 (1990).
103 See id.
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Few judgments in ordinary life require people to assess the pre-
dictability of past outcomes, but such judgments are pervasive in the
law.' 04 Several studies have demonstrated that the hindsight bias in-
fluences judgments of legal liability. 10 5 Kim Kamin and Jeffrey Rach-
linski, for example, compared foresight decisions regarding whether
to take a precaution against flooding with comparable hindsight eval-
uations of whether the failure to take this precaution was negligent. 10"
They instructed participants judging in foresight to recommend the
precaution if they believed that the flood was more than 10% likely to
occur in any given year (which was based on a cost-benefit comparison
of the precaution and the damage that a flood would likely cause).10 7
The researchers told the participants judging in hindsight that the
precaution had not been taken and that a flood causing $1 million in
damage had occurred.' 08 They instructed these participants to find
the defendant liable for the flood if the likelihood of the flood, from
the perspective of the defendant before the fact, was greater than 10%
in any given year. 10 9 Although both sets of participants reviewed iden-
tical information about the likelihood of a flood, the participants
reached different conclusions about appropriate defendant behav-
ior.110 Only 24% of foresight participants concluded that the likeli-
hood of a flood justified taking the precaution, while 57% of the
hindsight participants concluded that the flood was so likely that the
failure to take the precaution was negligent."' Because of the hind-
sight bias, the decision to refrain from taking the precaution seemed
reasonable to most participants ex ante, but it seemed unreasonable
to most participants ex post.
Because courts usually evaluate events after the fact, they are vul-
nerable to the hindsight bias." 2 Besides negligence determinations,
the hindsight bias likely influences claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel (decisions a lawyer makes in the course of representing a
criminal defendant can seem less competent after the defendant has
been convicted), the levying of sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (a motion or allegation seems less meritori-
ous after a court rejects it), and assessments of the liability of corpo-
104 SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REv. 571, 571 (1998).
105 See Hastie et al., supra note 13 at 605-09; Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 98-
99; LaBine & LaBine, supra note 13, at 509-11; Stallard & Worthington, supra note 13, at
677-81.
106 Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 93.
107 Id. at 97.
108 Id. at 95-96.
109 Id. at 97.
110 Id. at 94-99.
M Id at 98.
112 See Rachlinski, supra note 104, at 588-90.
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rate officers charged with making false predictions about their
company's performance (which can look like fraud after the predic-
tions fail to come true). 113 In short, the hindsight bias is a threat to
accurate determinations in many areas of law.
Recognition of the influence of the hindsight bias on legal judg-
ments has also inspired a set of proposed reforms,"'4 which include
greater reliance on judges.115 This approach is unlikely to be success-
ful, however, because the hindsight bias is one of the most robust cog-
nitive illusions. Greater reliance on judges is unlikely to eliminate its
effect on adjudication.'1 6 Although experience reduces the effect of
the hindsight bias somewhat,11 7 it does not eliminate it.
1. Hindsight Bias: Our Materials
To test whether judges are susceptible to the hindsight bias, we
presented each of the judges who participated in our study with a hy-
pothetical fact pattern based on an actual case, 118 labeled "Likely Out-
come of Appeal":
In 1991, a state prisoner filed a pro se Section 1983 action in
Federal District Court against the Director of the Department of
Criminal Justice in his state, asserting, among other things, that the
prison had provided him with negligent medical treatment in viola-
tion of Section 1983. The district court dismissed his complaint on
the ground that the provision of negligent medical care does not
violate Section 1983. The district court further found that the
plaintiff knew his claims were not actionable because he had made
similar claims several years earlier in a case that had been dismissed
by the court. Thus, the district court sanctioned the plaintiff pursu-
ant to Rule 11, ordering him to obtain the permission of the Chief
113 See generally id. at 602-24 (reviewing applications of the hindsight bias to legal
issues).
114 Hal R Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule.
Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR- L REv. 587, 630-36 (1994); Christincols, Cass R. Sun-
stein, & Richard Thaler, A Bdtavioral Approad to Law and EFonomics 50 SrTx'%. L RE%. 1471,
1527-33 (1998).
115 See Viscusi, supra note 21, at 60 (discussing various proposals to give judges more
authority over damages); see also Richard A. Posner, An Esonomia Approach to the Law of
Evidne4 51 STAN. L Roy. 1477, 1500-02 (1999) (describing perceived differences between
the decisions ofjuries and judges).
116 See Hoch & Loewenstein, supra note 101, at 606 ('[H]indsight bias is a robust plie-
nomenon that is not easily eliminated or even moderated." (citation omitted)). Even the
standard-bearer for economic analysis in the judiciary, Judge Richard Posner, has con-
fessed that he worries about the effects of the hindsight bias on his thought process. Ricti.
Am A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVwEsnIGA.TION, I.lMPEACHMENTr, A D TnL. OF
PaaSmmr CLINTON 2 (1999).
117 SeeJayJJ. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A
Meta-Analysis, 48 ORcANIz'rno,.AL BEIIAV. & HuM. DEcsIoN PRoc Esss 147, 155 (1991).
118 Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1993).
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Judge in the district before filing any more claims. The plaintiff
appealed the district court's decision.
We randomly assigned the judges to one of three conditions: the
"Lesser Sanction" condition; the "Affirmed" condition; or the "Va-
cated" condition. Judges in each condition learned of a different out-
come on appeal:
* "Lesser Sanction": "The court of appeals ruled that the district
court had abused its discretion under Rule 11 and remanded the
case for imposition of a less onerous Rule 11 sanction against the
plaintiff."
" "Affirmed": "The court of appeals affirmed the district court's de-
cision to impose this Rule 11 sanction on the plaintiff."
" "Vacated": "The court of appeals found that the district court
had abused its discretion and vacated the Rule 11 sanction against
the plaintiff."
We asked all of the judges, regardless of the condition to which
they were assigned, to predict which of the three actions the court of
appeals was most likely to have taken-that is, affirm, vacate, or re-
mand for lesser sanctions. The materials asked: "In light of the facts
of the case, as described in the passage above, which of the following
possible outcomes of the appeal was most likely to have occurred (as-
sume that the three outcomes below are the only possible ones)?"
The materials then listed the three possible outcomes. If the judges in
our sample were immune from the influence of the hindsight bias,
learning the outcome should not have affected their identification of
the outcome most likely to have occurred.
2. Hindsight Bias: Results
Knowing the outcome significantly affected judges' assess-
ments. 119 Table 2, below, shows that judges informed of a particular
outcome were much more likely than the other judges to have identi-
fied that outcome as the most likely to have occurred.1 20 Consider,
for example, the judges' assessment of the likelihood that the court of
appeals would affirm the district court's decision. When told that the
court of appeals had affirmed, 81.5% of the judges indicated that they
would have predicted that result. By contrast, only 27.8% of those
told the court of appeals had vacated, and only 40.4% of those told
the court of appeals had remanded for imposition of a lesser sanction,
indicated that an affirmance was the most likely outcome. Learning
119 X!(4) = 46.91, p < .001.
120 One of the fifty-eight judges in the "Lesser" condition declined to respond to this
question, one of the fifty-five judges in the "Affirm" condition declined to respond, and all
of the fifty-four judges in the "Vacate" condition responded.
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of an outcome ex ante dearly influenced the judges' ex post assess-
ments of the likelihood of various possible outcomes.
TABLE 2: HINDSIGHT BIAs: PERCENTAGE OFJUDGES IDENTiFaNG EACH
OuTcoME As THE MosT LIKELY, By CONDITION
Outcome Provided % Selecting as Most Likely Outcome
Lesser Affirmed Vacated
Lesser 38.6 40.4 21.1
Affirmed 7.4 81.5 11.1
Vacated 20.4 27.8 51.9
Note: Boldface numbers indicate the percentage ofjudges identif)ing the given outcome as the
most likely.
The sum of the percentage ofjudges in each of the three condi-
tions who selected the outcome that they were told had occurred as
the "most likely to have occurred" was 172%. It would have been
100% if learning the outcome had had no effect on thejudges. Thus,
the judges exhibited a predictable hindsight bias; when they learned
that a particular outcome had occurred, they were much more likely
to identify that outcome as the most likely to have occurred.
3. Hindsight Bias: Discussion
Learning the alleged outcome on appeal influenced the judges'
assessments of which outcome had been the most likely. Whether
they were aware of it or not, the judges' judgments in hindsight were
influenced by knowledge that they could not have had in foresight.
Some have argued that results such as ours do not really reflect
an illusion ofjudgment but reflect a rational use of new knowledge.' 2 '
Proponents of these arguments misunderstand the nature of the hind-
sight bias. The hindsight bias does not consist of using known out-
comes to update one's beliefs about future events;'122 that process is
simply learning from experience, which is perfectly rational. Rather,
the hindsight bias consists of using known outcomes to assess the pre-
dictability at some earlier time of something that has already hap-
pened. When we asked the judges in our study to determine what
appellate outcome they would have predicted, the outcome that we
provided to them was irrelevant. Nevertheless, learning the outcome
changed the judges' beliefs about Rule 11 sanctions in a pro se pris-
121 Mark Kelman, David E. Fallas, & Hilary Folger, Dcromposing Hindsight Bia% 16J. RisK
& UNcERTAINnl 251, 253-54 (1998); Posner, supra note 115, at 1528 ("[H]indsight bias is
often rational.").
122 Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 102, at 311.
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oner case because the judges relied on this new information to re-
predict the past outcome.
Some might criticize the form of our question because we did not
specifically ask the judges to disregard what they had learned but in-
stead asked them only what they thought was the most likely outcome.
Nevertheless, the questions are formally identical because determin-
ing what one would have predicted requires ignoring what one al-
ready knows. The questions are also functionally identical, as several
studies of the hindsight bias reveal.1 23 For example, studies have
found that asking (as we did) "what was most likely" produces identi-
cal results to asking "what would you have predicted had you not
known the outcome" and "what would others who have not been told
the outcome have predicted."' 24 Furthermore, our findings are con-
sistent with other studies showing that judges are vulnerable to the
hindsight bias.' 25
Our conclusion that the hindsight bias misleads judges has anec-
dotal support in some published judicial opinions. For example, the
law governing trusts includes an infamous opinion in which a court
held a trustee liable for failing to sell stock before the stock market
crash of 1929.126 The court reasoned that "[i] t was common knowl-
edge, not only amongst bankers and trust companies, but the general
public as well, that the stock market condition at the time of [the]
testator's death was an unhealthy one, that values were very much in-
flated and that a crash was almost sure to occur."'1 27 Obviously, the
court's ex post assessment of the ex ante likelihood of the crash was
influenced by being aware of the crash. In other similar cases, courts
have held trustees liable for investing in a company in spite of "'dis-
quieting information' contained in a prospectus"'128 for selling securi-
ties at the "bottom of the market."129 How the trustees in these cases
were supposed to have known that the disquieting information was
more predictive than the positive signals that the prospectus included
or that a stock price had actually reached bottom is unclear. The de-
fendants in these cases were victims of the hindsight bias.
When predicting the likelihood of something after the fact,
judges cannot help but rely on facts that were unavailable before the
fact. Judges' susceptibility to the hindsight bias is troubling because
judges are frequently expected to suppress their knowledge of some
123 Id. at 314-16.
124 See Fischhoff, supra note 101, at 293-95.
125 Anderson et al., supra note 21, at 730; Viscusi, supra note 21, at 55; Jennings et al.,
supra note 21.
126 In re Chamberlain, 156 A. 42, 42 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1931).
127 Id. at 43.
128 Chase v. Peaver, 419 N.E.2d 1358, 1368 (Mass. 1981).
129 First Nat'1 Bank v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 428 (Ala. 1982).
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set of facts before making decisions. When deciding whether to sup-
press evidence found during a police search, for example, judges are
expected to ignore their knowledge of the outcome of the search for
purposes of determining whether the police had probable cause to
conduct the search. When assessing the reasonableness of precau-
tions taken by a tort defendant, judges are expected to disregard their
knowledge of the plaintiff's ensuing injury. Although we did not test
the operation of the hindsight bias on judicial decision making in
these circumstances, our results suggest that judges are vulnerable to
the influence of the hindsight bias in these and other contexts.
D. Representativeness Heuristic
When people make categorical judgments (e.g., assessing the
likelihood that a criminal defendant is guilty), they tend to base their
judgments on the extent to which the evidence being analyzed (e.g.,
the defendant's demeanor) is representative of the category.1  When
the evidence appears representative of, or similar to, the category
(e.g., defendant is nervous and shifty), people judge the likelihood
that the evidence is a product of that category as high (i.e., evidence
of guilt). When the evidence being analyzed does not resemble the
category (e.g., defendant appears at ease), people judge the likeli-
hood that the evidence is a product of that category as low (i.e., evi-
dence of innocence). Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as the
"representativeness heuristic."13'
Although the representativeness heuristic is useful, it can lead
people to discount relevant statistical information. In particular, peo-
ple undervalue the importance of the frequency with which the un-
130 Professors Kahneman and Tversky describe tie representativeness heuristic in a
series of articles. SeeAmos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Bellef in the Law of Small Nubers,
76 PSYCHOL BuLu 105 (1971) (exploring the human tendency to treat a sample as more
representative of a population than is justified by probability theory); Daniel Kahnemna &
Amos Tversky, Subjective Probabilit.: A Judgnent of Representati, nesm 3 CorNIvE PsYCOt.
430 (1972) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability] (first defining the "rep-
resentativeness heuristic"); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tersky, On the Po'dholog of Pn'die-
tion, 80 PSyCHOL Rzv. 237 (1973) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky
, 
Prediction]
(expanding upon their earlier treatment of the representativeness heuristic); Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 8, at 1124-28 (explaining arious decision errors caused by the rep-
resentativeness heuristic); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,Judmnw ts of and by Rpresen-
tativeness, inJUDGMENT UNER UNCERTAIrY'r. HEuSTRICS , ND BLsEs 84 (Daniel Kahneman,
Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, qresentatiri-
ness] (synthesizing their prior work on representativeness); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning. The Coidundion FallaOy in Probabiliy'Jutdg.
ment 90 PswcHOL REv. 293 (1983) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Conjunction Falla']
(exploring the "conjunction fallacy," a manifestation of the representativeness heuristic).
131 Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probabili, supra note 130, at 431 (conceding that
representativeness "is easier to assess than to characterize" because "no general definition
[of it] is available"); see also PLous, supra note 8, at 110 (noting that this definition of
representativeness is "abstract and a little hard to understand").
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derlying category occurs-this is known as the "base-rate" statistic.1 32
In one study, for example, researchers asked college students to indi-
cate whether a person who "is of high intelligence, although lacking
in . .. creativity[,] . .. has a [high] need for order and clarity, . . .
writ[es in a] ... dull and mechanical [fashion],... [and] seems to
have... little sympathy for other people" is more likely to be a gradu-
ate student in computer science or in humanities and education.13 3
Although the participants believed that there were three times as
many graduate students in humanities and education than in com-
puter science, they rated it far more likely that the person described
by the researchers was a graduate student in computer science.13 4
Even though this background or base-rate information is obviously
highly relevant, people routinely ignore it or discount it when making
categorical judgments.13 5
Psychological research does not clearly indicate why people ig-
nore base rates and rely on the representativeness heuristic when
making categoricaljudgments. Individuating evidence is more salient
and vivid, and hence more compelling than pallid base-rate statis-
tics. l3 6 Also, because relevant statistical evidence is commonly unavail-
able, it might simply be more efficient for people to focus on
individuating evidence. 13 7
What is clear, however, is that excess reliance on the representa-
tiveness heuristic leads people to commit a variety of decision-making
errors. 138 In legal decision making, for example, the failure to attend
132 Kahneman & Tversky, Prediction, supra note 130, at 238. The authors point out
that:
[fln many situations, representative outcomes are indeed more likely than
others. However, this is not always the case because there are factors (e.g.,
the prior probabilities of outcomes and the reliability of the evidence)
which affect the likelihood of outcomes but not their representativeness.
Because these factors are ignored, intuitive predictions violate the statistical
rules of prediction in systematic and fundamental ways.
Id.
133 Id. at 238-39.
134 Id.
135 But seeJonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive, Normative,
and Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 1, 1-2 (1996) (arguing that the propo-
nents of the representativeness heuristic have overstated the extent to which people actu-
ally neglect base rates).
136 See RICHARD NISBEiT & LEE Ross, HuMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMI-
INGS OF SOCIALJUDGMENT 150 (1980) (relating "the capacity of vivid, concrete data to make
a greater impact on inferences than that made by data that are evidentially superior but
dull and abstract in quality" to the phenomena of base-rate neglect).
137 See generally Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal
Way: Models of Bounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. RExv. 650 (1996) (discussing efficient deci-
sion-making strategies).
138 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 8, at 1124-27 (explaining various decision errors
caused by the representativeness heuristic). Some scholars have taken issue with the em-
pirical work that supports the representativeness heuristic. See, e.g., Leda Cosmides &John
[Vol. 86:777
HeinOnline  -- 86 Cornell L. Rev. 806 2000-2001
VNSIDE TH JUDICUaL MND
to base rates can induce a troublesome problem known as the "inverse
fallacy."13 9 The inverse fallacy refers to the tendency to treat the
probability of a hypothesis given the evidence (for example, the
probability that a defendant was negligent given that a plaintiff was
injured) as the same as, or close to, the probability of the evidence
given the hypothesis (for example, the probability that the plaintiff
would be injured if the defendant were negligent).140
Suppose, for example, that a forensic expert testifies in a criminal
case that a DNA sample from the defendant matches the DNA sample
found at a crime scene. Further suppose that this expert indicates
that the probability that a randomly selected sample would match the
sample from the crime scene is one in a million. Committing the in-
verse fallacy here means believing that the likelihood that the defen-
dant is innocent is also one in a million. This inference, however,
would be incorrect because the probability that the defendant is inno-
cent also depends on the size of the population from which the sus-
pect's DNA was drawn and the reliability of the DNA test. 1 11 If the
defendant were randomly selected from a population of four million
suspects, for example, one would expect that there are three other
people who are just as likely to have committed the crime as the de-
fendant. Mock jury research suggests that the inverse fallacy influ-
ences jurors' assessments of forensic evidence.1 42
As trained legal professionals, judges might have an advantage
over other experts in these reasoning tasks. One prior study indicated
that graduate training in law reduces the likelihood that a person will
Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statistidans After All? Rethinhing Son Conulsions from the
Literature onJudgment Under Uncertaint#, 58 CoGNMoN 1, 3-4 (1996) (arguing that people
use a "frequentist" rather than a "Bayesian" approach to probability analsis); Koehler,
supra note 135, at 3 (arguing that Tversky and Kahneman have overstated the extent to
which people actually neglect base rates); Peter R. Mueser, Nelson Cowan, & Kim T.
Mueser, A Generalized Signal Detection Model to Predict Rational Variation in Base Rate Uso, 69
COGNION 267, 268-69 (1999) (arguing that a normative model vfih less restrictive as-
sumptions better explains how people make probabilistic judgments than does dte repre-
sentativeness account).
139 See Jonathan J. Koehler, 117ty DNA Lifteliliood Ratios Should Account for Error (Even
When a National Research Council Report Says They Should Not), 37 Jum.,%tETPics J. 425, 432
(1997).
140 Se4 eg., id. ("Failure to consider the frequency of a phenomenon whten predicting
its chance of occurrence in a specific instance can lead to inverse fallacies in which people
mistakenly conclude that the denominator of the [likelihood ratio] is identical to the de-
nominator of the posterior odds ratio.").
141 See id. at 433.
142 See David L Faigman & A. J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Tial Proress: In-
structing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 L~w & Hut. BXLw. 1, 7-13 (1988);
William C. Thompson & Edward L Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Crimi-
nal Trials: The Prosecutors Fallacy and the Defense Attorney s Fallay, 11 Lmw & HuL'a. Braw.
167, 174-75, 178-80 (1987).
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commit the inverse fallacy. 143 Nevertheless, studies have shown that
other professionals who should be adept at such tasks, such as doctors,
commit the fallacy in overwhelming numbers. 44
1. Representativeness Heuristic: Our Materials
To test whether judges would commit the inverse fallacy, we gave
the judges in our study a res ipsa loquitur problem. In an item la-
beled "Evaluation of Probative Value of Evidence in a Torts Case," we
presented all of the judges with a paragraph-long description of a case
based loosely on the classic English case, Byrne v. Boadle'1
The plaintiff was passing by a warehouse owned by the defen-
dant when he was struck by a barrel, resulting in severe injuries. At
the time, the barrel was in the final stages of being hoisted from the
ground and loaded into the warehouse. The defendant's employ-
ees are not sure how the barrel broke loose and fell, but they agree
that either the barrel was negligently secured or the rope was faulty.
Government safety inspectors conducted an investigation of the
warehouse and determined that in this warehouse: (1) when barrels
are negligently secured, there is a 90% chance that they will break
loose; (2) when barrels are safely secured, they break loose only 1%
of the time; (3) workers negligently secure barrels only 1 in 1,000
times.
The materials then asked: "Given these facts, how likely is it that the
barrel that hit the plaintiff fell due to the negligence of one of the
workers"? The materials provided the judges with one of four
probability ranges to select: 0-25%, 26-50%, 51-75%, or 76-100%.
When presented with a problem like this one, most people com-
mit the inverse fallacy and assume the likelihood that the defendant
was negligent is 90%, or at least a high percentage.146 (Indeed, the
inverse fallacy might account for a logical flaw in the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur first noted by Professor David aye, which we describe
below.) 147 In fact, however, the actual probability that the defendant
143 See Lehman et al., supra note 27, at 440.
144 Ward Casscells, Arno Schoenberger, & Thomas B. Graboy, Interpretations by Physi-
cians of Clinical Laboratory Results, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 999, 999-1000 (1978).
145 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex- Ch. 1863).
146 See David M. Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: Problems and Opportuni.
ties, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY- HEUusarics AND BIASES 249, 253-54 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
147 Professor Kaye identified the logical problems with the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
more than 20 years ago. See David Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res Ipsa Loquitur, 77 Mitj.
L. REv. 1456, 1458-64 (1979). The Restatement (Second) of Torts articulated the doctrine as
follows:
It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negli-
gence of the defendant when (a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily
does not occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes,
including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently
808 [Vol. 86:777
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was negligent is only 8.3%. To explain, we describe the conditional
probabilities of the four possible outcomes, given the hypothetical
facts we provided, in Table 3, below:





Actual Negligent 0.090% 0.010% 0.10%
Condition
Not Negligent 0.999% 98.901% 99.90%
Total 1.089% 9.911% 100%
Because the defendant is negligent .1% of the time and is 90% likely
to cause an injury under these circumstances, the probability that a
victim would be injured by the defendant's negligence is .09% (and
the probability that the defendant is negligent but causes no injury is
.01%). Because the defendant is not negligent 99.9% of the time and
is 1% likely to cause an injury under these circumstances, the
probability that on any given occasion a victim would be injured even
though the defendant took reasonable care is 0.999% (and the
probability that the defendant is not negligent and causes no injury is
98.901%). As a result, the conditional probability that the defendant
is negligent given that the plaintiff is injured equals .090% divided by
1.089%, or 8.3%.
2. Representativeness Heuristic: Results
Of the 159 judges who responded to the question,14 8 40.9% se-
lected the right answer by choosing 0-25%; 8.8% indicated 26-50%;
10.1% indicated 51-75%; and 40.3% indicated 76-100%. Overall, the
judges did well; more than 40% of them got the correct answer to a
difficult question in a short period of time. Thosejudges who did not
get the correct answer, however, exhibited a significant tendency to
choose the highest range. 149 Although we did not inquire into the
reasoning process that led these judges to their answers, the number
of judges who chose the highest range suggests that many committed
eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the
scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
RESTATEFNm.NT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 328D(1) (1965). Drafts of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts correct this error. See infra note 158.
148 Eight out of 167judges, or 4.8%, did not respond.
149 x(2) = 53.24, p <.001. The statistic tests against the null hypothesis that the distri-
bution of incorrect responses ras random.
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the inverse fallacy. In fact, roughly as many judges gave the right an-
swer as gave the answer suggested by the inverse fallacy.
3. Representativeness Heuristic: Discussion
When presented with problems like this one, most expert deci-
sion makers over-rely on the representativeness heuristic and commit
the inverse fallacy.' 50 The judges in our sample, by contrast, were im-
pressive. Roughly 40% of the judges answered this difficult eviden-
tiary question correctly. At the same time, however, roughly 60% of
the judges answered incorrectly, and two-third of those (40% of the
total) selected the erroneous answer that reliance on the representa-
tiveness heuristic would suggest is correct. Thus, although the judges
in our sample performed better than other previously studied groups,
40% of the judges fell into the trap that the representativeness heuris-
tic creates.
Overreliance on the representativeness heuristic explains some
important quirks in judicial behavior and legal doctrine. For exam-
ple, the representativeness heuristic might account for judges' appar-
ent preference for individuating evidence (e.g., eyewitness testimony)
over statistical evidence (e.g., base rates). 151 Case law is replete with
expressions of this preference. In one famous case, for example, a
plaintiff who was unable to identify the defendant's bus directly tried
to rely on statistical evidence that the defendant owned the bus that
injured her.15 2 Despite the evidentiary value of the plaintiffs base-
rate evidence, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to
allow the plaintiff to rely solely on that evidence to prove that the
defendant's bus was responsible for her injuries.'55 Although other
valid policy reasons might also support this preference, 15 4 our study
suggests that this preference may simply be the result of a cognitive
illusion.
The representativeness heuristic has also led judges to create er-
roneous legal doctrine. As Professor Kaye has noted, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur (upon which the problem in our questionnaire is
based) historically includes a radical misunderstanding of probability
150 See Eddy, supra note 146, at 253-54.
151 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JuD.NMENT
UNDER UNCERTA T. HEuRIsrcs AND BIAsES 153, 156-58 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, &
Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
152 Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945).
153 Id.
154 See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REa. 1357, 1368-77 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by lMathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1344-50 (1971). But see
Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accura
Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. Rxv. 247, 27'175
(1990) (arguing for greater reliance on statistical evidence in the courts).
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theory.155 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, ajury can in-
fer that the defendant is negligent from the occurrence of an event
that is "of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
negligence. " 56 This inference owes its superficial appeal to the repre-
sentativeness heuristic.15 7 Even if an event does not ordinarily occur
when negligence is absent, the event still may be more likely to be the
product of non-negligence than negligence. In the problem that we
used in this study, for example, the accident was unlikely to occur
when the defendant was not negligent. Nevertheless, because negli-
gence was rare, the event was still unlikely to have been caused by
negligence. Although the most recent version of the Restatement
(Third) of Products Liability and drafts of the Restatement (Third) of Torts
both remedy this logical error,158 it has lingered in the courts for over
a century. We submit that the error owes its existence to the failure to
attend to base-rate statistics.
E. Egocentric Biases
People tend to make judgments about themselves and their abili-
ties that are "egocentric" or "self-serving."159 People routinely esti-
mate, for example, that they are above average on a variety of
desirable characteristics, including health, 60 driving,'0 ' professional
155 Kaye, supra note 147, at 1457.
156 RESrATE-ENT (SECOND) OF ToRas § 328D(1) (a) (1965).
157 SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance orAdaplation?, 79
OR. L. REv. 61, 82-85 (2000).
158 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability includes the follming language to
describe the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff ias caused by a
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, ithout proof of
a specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect;
and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.
REsrATEMENT (THntn) oFToR-rs: PRODUCTS LAirnm § 3 (1998). The proposed Rstaternunt
(Third) of Torts: General Principles, adopts the following language for res ipsa loquitur "It
may be inferred that the defendant has been negligent when the accident causing the
plaintiff's physical harm is a type of accident that ordinarily happens because of the negli-
gence of the class of actors of which the defendant is the relevant member." RsrArTL%-r
(THRD) OF ToRTs: GENERAL PRINcIpiEs § 15 (Discussion Draft, 1999).
159 See, eg., Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availabiliy and Attribution,
37 J. PERsoNALIY & Soc. PSvCHOL. 322 (1979) (testing for egocentric biases in joint
activities).
160 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Evtn ts 39J. P-rso..ALrrv
& Soc. PSyCHOL 806, 809-11 (1980).
161 See Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Riskyq and More Sldlful Than Our Fellow Drvers? 47
AcrA PSvCHOLOGICA 143, 145-46 (1981).
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skills,1 6 2 and likelihood of having a successful marriage. 63 Moreover,
people overestimate their contribution to joint activities. For exam-
ple, after a conversation both parties will estimate that they spoke
more than half the time."'l Similarly, when married couples are
asked to estimate the percentage of household tasks they perform,
their estimates typically add up to more than 100%.165
Egocentric biases occur for several reasons. First, of course, is
self-presentation. 166 People may not really believe that they are better
than average, but they will nonetheless tell researchers that they
are.167 Second, people engage in confirmatory mental searches for
evidence that supports a theory they want to believe, such as that their
marriage will succeed.16 8 They have no comparable data on the na-
ture of strangers' marriages, so the only evidence they find suggests
that theirs is more likely than others' to be successful.' 69 Third, mem-
ory is egocentric in that people remember their own actions better
than others' actions. 170 Thus, when asked to recall the percentage of
housework they perform, people remember their own contribution
more easily and, consequently tend to overestimate it.17t Finally,
many of the constructs involved in egocentric biases are ambiguous,
and thus, people can define success differently.172 For example, safe
driving means different things to different people, and as a result, eve-
ryone really can drive safer than average, at least as measured by their
own standards.
17 3
Egocentric biases can be adaptive, but they can also have an un-
fortunate influence on the litigation process.174 Due to egocentric bi-
ases, litigants and their lawyers might overestimate their own abilities,
162 See KL Patricia Cross, Not Can, But Will College Teaching Be Improved, NEw DIREc.
TIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC., Spring 1997, at 1, 9-10.
163 See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Per-
ceptions and Expectations ofDivorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & Hum. BE AV. 439, 441-43
(1993) (finding that recently married couples almost unanimously expect that they will not
get divorced, despite knowing that the divorce rate is fifty percent).
164 See Ross & Sicoly, supra note 159, at 324.
165 1d. at 325-26.
166 See SusAN T. FisE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 78-82 (1991) (describ-
ing theories that account for egocentric biases).
167 See id.
168 See id.
169 See Baker & Emery, supra note 163, at 44648.
170 See FisKE & TAYLOR, supra note 166, at 78-82.
171 See Ross & Sicoly, supra note 159, at 324.
172 George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer, & Linda Babcock, Self-
Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 141 (1993)
(discussing the origins of egocentric biases).
173 See Svenson, supra note 161, at 145-46.
174 See, e.g., Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, J. ECON. PEase., Winter 1997, at 109, 110-11; Babcock & Pogarsky,
supra note 64, at 352-54; Loewenstein et al., supra note 172, at 140-55.
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the quality of their advocacy, and the relative merits of their cases. 175
These views, in turn, are likely to undermine settlement efforts. In
one study, for example, Professor George Loewenstein and his col-
leagues asked undergraduates and law students to assess the value of a
tort case in which the plaintiff had sued the defendant for $100,000 in
damages arising from an automobile-motorcycle collision.176 These
researchers assigned some participants to play the role of plaintiff and
others the role of defendant, but they provided both sets of partici-
pants with identical information about the case.' 77 Nevertheless, the
participants interpreted the facts in self-serving ways. When asked to
predict the amount they thought the judge would award in the case,
the participants evaluating the case from the perspective of the plain-
tiff predicted that the judge would award $14,527 more than the de-
fendant-participants predicted. 78 When asked to identify what they
perceived to be a fair settlement value, plaintiff-participants selected a
value $17,709 higher than the value selected by defendant-partici-
pants. 179 These results suggest that self-serving or egocentric biases
can lead to bargaining impasse and wasteful litigation.
Like litigants and lawyers, judges might also be inclined to inter-
pret information in self-serving or egocentric ways. Egocentric biases
could lead judges to believe that they are better decision makers than
is really the case.
1. Egocentric Biases: Our Matefials
To test whether judges are prone to egocentric biases, we asked
the judges participating in our study to respond to a simple question.
In an item labeled "Appeal Rates," we asked the judges to estimate
their reversal rates on appeal: "United States magistrate judges are
rarely overturned on appeal, but it does occur. If we were to rank all
of the magistrate judges currently in this room according to the rate at
which their decisions have been overturned during their careers,
[what] would your rate be"? We then asked the judges to place them-
selves into the quartile corresponding to their respective reversal
rates: highest (i.e., >75%), second-highest (>50%), third-highest
175 See, ag., Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 174, at 119 (noting that egocentric
biases are likely to be "an important determinant of bargaining impasse"); Babcock &
Pogarsky, supra note 64, at 352-53 (noting that there is "abundant empirical evidence that
individuals consistently exhibit 'self-serving biases' during negotiations7).
176 Loewenstein et al., supra note 172, at 145.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 150.
179 Id.
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(>25%), or lowest (<25%). The materials explained the meaning of
each quartile in careful detail.' 80
2. Egocentric Biases: Results
In their responses to the questionnaire, the judges exhibited an
egocentric bias. Of the 155 judges who responded to this question,18 '
56.1% reported that their appeal rate placed them in the lowest quar-
tile; 31.6% placed themselves in the second-lowest quartile; 7.7% in
the second-highest quartile, and 4.5% in the highest quartile. In
other words, 87.7% of the judges believed that at least half of their
peers had higher reversal rates on appeal. This pattern of results dif-
fers significantly from what one would expect if judges were
unbiased.18 2
It is possible that the 56.1% of the judges who placed themselves
in the lowest quartile have never been overturned on appeal, which
suggests that they really do belong in the lowest quartile. In fact, sev-
eral judges indicated that they had never been reversed. If so, how-
ever, the 31.6% of judges who placed themselves in the next lowest
quartile were wrong, and in any event, it is impossible for only 4.5% of
the judges to be in the highest quartile. Even if the 56.1% of the
judges in the lowest quartile had never been overturned on appeal,
and hence were being as accurate as possible, the remaining 43.9% of
the judges exhibited a significant egocentric bias.183
3. Egocentric Biases: Discussion
The judges in our study exhibited a strong egocentric bias con-
cerning the likelihood that they would be overturned on appeal. The
results do not, however, reveal whether the judges truly believed their
egocentric answers or were simply unwilling to admit that they had
high reversal rates. Given that the judges knew that their responses
were anonymous, they had little reason to hide their true beliefs. Fur-
thermore, the results of similar studies of egocentric biases indicate
that although self-presentation effects explain some of the results,
most people genuinely believe that they are better than average at a
variety of endeavors.' 8 4 Also, our results are similar to those found in
180 For example, next to the line marked "[in the highest quartile," we include the
following explanation: "(meaning the rate at which you have been overturned is higher
than that of 75% of the magistrate judges in this room)."
181 Twelve judges out of 167 (7.2%) declined to respond to this question.
182 X2(3) = 107.3, p < .001. The statistic tests the null hypothesis that 25% of the re-
sponses would fall into each of the four quartiles (which would be normatively correct).
183 X2(2) = 46.4, p < .001. The statistic tests the null hypothesis that the responses
would fall equally into each of the three quartiles other than the highest (which would be
normatively correct).
184 See Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note 174, at 110-11.
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a study of bankruptcy judges conducted by Professor Theodore Eisen-
berg.185 Eisenberg's study showed that bankruptcy judges expressed
substantially different beliefs than the attorneys who appeared before
them, even as to seemingly objective matters, such as whether judges
grant interim fee applications. 186 Also, the bankruptcy judges in Ei-
senberg's study overestimated the degree to which the lawyers who
appear in front of them feel fairly treated. 8 7
Egocentric biases might prevent judges from maintaining an
awareness of their limitations; in turn, this might work to the detri-
ment of litigants appearing in their courtrooms. For example, a fed-
eral district judge can grant an interlocutory appeal only if she is
willing to concede that she has issued a ruling on a matter of law "as to
which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion."1' s Thus,
a litigant seeking to persuade ajudge to grant an interlocutory appeal
must convince her that another judge could easily disagree with her
ruling. Similarly, prisoners seeking an appeal from a federal district
court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus must first seek a
certificate of appealability from the same court that rejected the
claim. 189 Obtaining the certificate of appealability requires that the
prisoner demonstrate to ajudge that he or she denied a claim in a way
that "reasonable jurists would find... debatable or wrong." 90 The
influence of the egocentric bias likely makes it difficult for litigants to
convince federal judges that they might have been wrong.
Finally, egocentric biases might make it unlikely that judges will
grant requests to set aside judgments in both civil and criminal
cases. 191 Even in ajury trial, egocentric biases might lead the judge to
react too skeptically to the suggestion that the trial over which he pre-
sided produced an erroneous result. More generally, egocentric bi-
ases may make it hard for judges to recognize that they can and do
make mistakes.
At the same time, egocentric biases can be beneficial. Psycholo-
gists argue that having a somewhat inflated belief in one's abilities
helps maintain one's morale and ensures a healthy sense of well-be-
ing.192 Also, society surely prefers its judges to be resolute and self-
assured rather than timid and insecure. Egocentric beliefs may in-
185 Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 98-87.
186 Id. at 983 tbl.1.
187 Id. at 986 tbl.2.
188 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994).
189 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
190 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
191 In civil cases, such requests can be made under FED. R. Crv. P. 59 and FED. R. Cir.
P. 60. In criminal cases, collateral attacks on the verdict can be brought under 28 US.C.
§ 2255 (Supp. IV 1998).
192 See Shelley E. Taylor &Jonathan D. Brown, Illusion and VWIa.Being: A Social Pychdogi-
cal Perspective on Mental HealtI, 103 PSYCHOL BuLL. 193, 199-200 (1988).
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duce judges to see the world in a self-serving fashion, but the justice
system may ultimately be better off because of it.
F. Cognitive Illusions in Judges and Other Decision Makers
Our study indicates that judicial decision making, like the deci-
sion making of other experts and laypeople, is influenced by the cog-
nitive illusions we tested. But do these cognitive illusions influence
judges as much as they influence other decision makers? It is difficult
to answer this question accurately, because different studies use differ-
ent materials and methodologies. Nevertheless, in Table 4, below, we
compare our results to the results of studies of other decision
makers. 193
Table 4 shows that the judges in our study appear to be just as
susceptible as other decision makers to three of the cognitive illusions
we tested: anchoring, hindsight bias, and egocentric bias. Though
still susceptible to framing and the representativeness heuristic, the
judges appear less susceptible than other decision makers to these ef-
fects. We consider each below.
Judges in our study proved susceptible to anchoring effects, as
have laypersons in mockjury studies. Direct comparisons between the
size of the effect of the anchor are difficult because our materials dif-
fered substantially from those used in the mock-jury studies. In partic-
ular, most mock-jury studies have used anchors that are higher than
the expected awards in the absence of an anchor, while we used an
anchor that was lower than the expected awards in the absence of an
anchor. Also, the source of the anchor in most mock-jury studies is a
damage request from the plaintiffs lawyer, while we used the jurisdic-
tional limit for diversity suits in federal court. The only study to com-
pare a low anchor with a condition without any anchor found that the
anchor reduced mean awards from $167,812 to $90,333.194 Although
the percentage reduction in mean awards in that study of mock jurors
exceeded the one we found in our study ofjudges (46% versus 29%),
we found a greater mean reduction in absolute dollars (roughly
$77,000 versus $368,000).
In comparable studies of framing effects, researchers have found
much larger differences in settlement rates between subjects in the
gains-frame condition and subjects in the losses-frame condition. The
judges in our study were fifteen percentage points more inclined to
say that plaintiff rather than defendant should settle, while other stud-
ies using student subjects have found fourteen to fifty-one percentage-
193 In constructing the comparisons in Table 4, we contrasted our results with those of
studies that used materials that were the most comparable to the questions that we used in
our study.
'94 Malouff & Schutte, supra note 15, at 494-95 tbl.1.
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TABLE 4: JUDGES AS COMPARED TO OTHER DECISION NAiWERS
Cognitive Compared to
Illusion Others
Our Test for tw Normative Evpec- Size of the Ob-
Illusion lation (Without sencd Effert in
the Ifluence of Our Stidy
tMe Cognitive Mu-
sion)
Anchoring Estimated dam- No difference Anchor reduced Comparable
Effects ages with and between condi- auards by 29%
without a low dons
anchor
Framing Settlement rates No difference Settlement rate Better
Effects in gains and between condi- 15 percentage
losses frames tions points higher in
gains frame
Hindsight Percent identify- Total percent- Percentage Comparable
Bias ing known out- age ofjudges identifying
come as most identifying known outcome
likely outcome known outcome summed to
(across 3 condi- 172%
dons) sums to
100%
Represen- Solution to evi- All choose the 41% chose cor- Better
tativeness dentiary prob- correct answer rect answer
Heuristic lem
Egocentric Identifying rela- Uniform distri- 56% chose low- Comparable
Bias tive rate of be- bution of an- est quartile;
ing overturned svers across 88% report be-
on appeal (in four quartiles ing better than
quartiles) the median
1_ 1 judge
point differences between subjects in the two conditions.'19 In the
prior study most similar to ours, Jeffrey Rachlinski gave law student
subjects a hypothetical copyright scenario and found a forty-six per-
centage-point difference in settlement rates between plaintiff and de-
fendant subjects, 196 a much larger effect than we observed in our
study. Although the stakes in Rachlinski's study were higher
($400,000 as opposed to $200,000) and the overall settlement rate dif-
fered (54% in Rachlinski's study versus 68% in our study), the differ-
ence between the results of the two studies suggests that judges are
less susceptible to framing effects. This conclusion is consistent with
195 See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 86, at 130-38; Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 135-
44.
196 Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 144.
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previous studies indicating that experienced lawyers are less suscepti-
ble to the influence of framing.197
The judges in our study exhibited hindsight bias to the same ex-
tent as mock jurors and other laypersons. Our study differs from most
studies of the hindsight bias because we asked the judges to choose
among three options rather than to assign specific probability esti-
mates. In a statistical review of studies of the hindsight bias in circum-
stances similar to legal judgments, researchers found that the
hindsight bias alters the decisions of 27% of the subjects. s98 This ap-
proximates our finding that 24% of the judges in our study made a
different choice because of the hindsight bias.' 99 Our result is also
within the range of shifts observed in previous mock-jury studies of the
hindsight bias.200 Finally, the hindsight bias is one of two illusions we
tested that previous researchers have tested on judges, and our results
are consistent with the findings of this prior research.20'
The judges in our study were much more attentive than other
experts to base-rate statistics and were much less likely to make deci-
sions based solely on the representativeness of the evidence. Our
materials differed somewhat from previous studies in that we asked
the judges to select one of four answers rather than to provide a spe-
cific probability estimate. Nevertheless, in a comparable study, only
18% of doctors-as compared to 40% of the judges in our study-
provided the correct answer to a problem like ours.20 2
Finally, the judges in our study exhibited egocentric biases com-
parable to those exhibited by subjects in other similar studies.20 3 In
our study, 87.7% of the judges rated themselves as less likely to be
overturned than the average judge. Judges in our sample were only
slightly more modest than university faculty-94% of whom rated
themselves as better than average teachers.2 04
197 Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 27, at 100-01 (finding that lawyer subjects did not
seem to be as affected by framing as laypersons).
198 Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, supra note 117, at 161 tbl.3.
199 172% minus 100% divided by 3 conditions.
200 Three mock-jury studies used binary decisions: Hastie et al., supra note 13, at 606
(24% shift); Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 98 (34% shift); Stallard & Worthington,
supra note 13, at 679 (28% shift).
201 SeeAnderson et al., supra note 21, at 725-30; Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 21, at 906;
Viscusi, supra note 21, at 46-55; Jennings et al., supra note 21. The studies conducted by
Professors Viscusi and Hastie found thatjudges were somewhat less susceptible to the hind-
sight bias, see Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 21, at 906; Viscusi, supra note 21, at 29, but we
suspect that the sample ofjudges in these studies (those who chose to attend a conference
on law and economics) and the context within which the study took place (a law and
economics conference) may have induced somewhat more calculated reasoning processes
that dampened the effect.
202 Casscells et al., supra note 144, at 1000.
203 Svenson, supra note 161, at 145-46.
204 Cross, supra note 162, at 10.
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G. Do These Findings Apply to Judges in the Courtroom?
Our study shows that judges rely on cognitive processes that are
likely to induce them to make systematic errors, but it does not con-
clusively demonstrate that judges actually make such errors in the
courtroom. The decisions thatjudges made in response to our mater-
ials differ from the decisions that they make in their courtrooms in
several important ways. In the courtroom, judges must make deci-
sions based on more detailed and complicated records, are more
highly motivated to make accurate judgments, and have more time
and resources to devote to the decision. Many cases also doubtless
turn on issues less subject to the effects of cognitive illusions. Others
are so straightforward that cognitive illusions should not influence the
outcome. These differences suggest that we should be cautious in in-
terpreting our results.
Nevertheless, it is likely that the results of our study have some
application to decisions made outside the laboratory. In our study, we
employed standard cognitive psychological research methods, which
have proven enormously successful in identifying decision-making
strategies that people use in making real decisions.20° The basic meth-
odology of cognitive psychologists-whether they study memory, -is-
ual perception, or judgment-is to tax people's cognitive abilities, to
determine their successes and failures, and then to infer how people
think based on their responses under these conditions."°6 These
methods frequently demonstrate that people make predictable errors,
thereby revealing their thought processes.
To the extent that the methods used in this study have identified
thought processes thatjudges use, the conclusions apply in the court-
room. After all, increased motivation and incentives "do not operate
by magic: they work by focusing attention and by prolonging delibera-
tion."207 Only if increased attention and greater deliberation enable
judges to abandon the heuristics that they are othenise inclined to
rely upon can they avoid the illusions ofjudgment that these heuris-
tics produce. This does not seem likely. "The corrective power of in-
205 See, eg., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Realiy of Cognithe Illusion, 103
PSYCHOiL REV. 582, 582 (1996). Some scholars have criticized these methods, however. See,
e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 138, at 11-14 (arguing that cognitive psychology is in-
consistent with principles of behavior derived from evolution); Gerd Gigerenzer, How to
Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear Beyond 'Heuristics and Biases'", 2 Eum REx,. Soc. PsyctioL.
83 (1991) (arguing that cognitive psychologists overstate the applicability of their findings
to real world decisions).
206 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 205, at 582 (explaining methods of cognitive
psychologists).
207 Tversky & Ralneman, Rational Choice, supra note 76, at S274.
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centives depends on the nature of the particular error and cannot be
taken for granted."20 8
Similarly, the greater detail that judges face in actual cases does
not by itself reduce the effects of cognitive illusions. The materials
used in our study, and in most cognitive psychological research on
human judgment, are intentionally simple. They are designed to iso-
late a particular pattern of thought. Factors other than any single cog-
nitive illusion can influence the decision made in a more complicated
case, but there is no guarantee that these other influences will swamp
the illusion so dramatically that the illusion's influence will be negligi-
ble. In fact, details actually feed into some cognitive illusions, includ-
ing the hindsight bias, and these illusions grow more powerful as the
materials upon which they are based become more detailed.2 0 9
Greater resources also provide no guaranteed protection against
the influence of cognitive illusions. Judges obviously can use the re-
sources they have to obtain better research and background informa-
tion to inform their decisions, but their time and resources are not
infinite. Even with greater resources, judges will still resort to cogni-
tive shortcuts. If judges are unaware of the cognitive illusions that
reliance on heuristics produces, then extra time and resources will be
of no help. Judges will believe that their decisions are sound and
choose not to spend the extra time and effort needed to make ajudg-
ment that is not influenced by cognitive illusions.
Perhaps the best support for the conclusion that susceptibility to
cognitive illusions will persist in the face of high motivation and great
detail are the results of those studies showing that cognitive illusions
adversely affect the quality of decisions made in the real world. In one
striking example, researchers demonstrated that framing effects per-
sist among poor people even when the stakes consist of two-months'
salary.210 Furthermore, several studies show that framing effects and
egocentric biases influence decisions when the stakes are high; for ex-
ample, framing effects and egocentric biases influence lawyers' assess-
ments of actual lawsuits. 21' Similarly, numerous case studies reveal
the influence of the hindsight bias on expert evaluations of the causes
of accidents.2 12
208 Id.
209 See Rachlinski, supra note 104, at 576.
210 Steven J. Kachelmeier & Mohamed Shehata, Examining Risk Preferences Under High
Monetar Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People's Republic of China, 82 Aml. EcoN. Rv.
1120, 1123-24 (1992).
211 Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 154 & tbl.2 (demonstrating that framing effects influ-
ence actual settlement negotiations); Marijke Malsch, Lawyers' Predictions ofJudicial Deci-
sions: A Study on Calibration of Experts (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vrije
Universiteit, Amsterdam) (on file with authors) (finding that lawyers in actual cases are
overconfident of their ability to predict judges' decisions).
212 Fischhoff, supra note 100.
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Most importantly, published judicial opinions include examples
of the influence of cognitive illusions. As noted above, the judge-
made res ipsa loquitur doctrine appears to be a product of overre-
liance on the representativeness heuristic. Thejudges in cases such as
Byrne v. Boadle surely were motivated to reach the right answer and
probably had the benefit of a detailed record. Nevertheless, these
judges, along with generations of otherjudges in a multitude of other
cases involving res ipsa loquitur (as well as the American Law Institute
in its Restatement of the Law of Torts) cemented this error into the com-
mon law for over a century. Similarly, judges applying the prudent-
investor rule to cases of trustee liability seem also to have fallen prey
to the hindsight bias.213 These examples suggest that the motivation,
detail, and resources that judges have available in deciding cases do
not necessarily enable them to avoid the effects of cognitive illusions.
In our study, we included items designed to identify patterns of
choices that would reveal whether judges rely on thought processes
that create cognitive illusions. The judges' answers to our questions
were not the random "noise" that one might expect ifjudges were not
attending carefully to the questions. Rather, the answers confirmed
predictions derived from psychological research on judgment and de-
cision making. In the course of making decisions in the courtroom,
judges certainly face more complex fact patterns, have more motiva-
tion to make good decisions, have more time to make decisions, and
receive assistance from litigants, lawyers, and clerks. But unless these
factors alter the fundamental ways judges think, they will not elimi-
nate the effects of cognitive illusions.
m
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Judges, it seems, are human.2 14 Like the rest of us, they use
heuristics that can produce systematic errors injudgment. Unlike the
rest of us, however, judges' judgments can compromise the quality of
justice that the courts deliver. What can the legal system do to avoid
or minimize the effects of cognitive illusions? There is no single, sim-
ple answer to this question. We discuss three potential remedies be-
low. First, judges might learn to educate themselves about cognitive
illusions so that they can try to avoid the errors that these illusions
tend to produce. Second, the legal system might consider reallocat-
ing decision-making power between judges and juries as a means of
reducing the effects of cognitive illusions. Third, judges and legisla-
213 See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
214 SeeJerome Frank, Are Judges Humran, 80 U. PA. L Rrx. 17, 233 (1931).
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tors might craft legal rules that minimize the adverse effects that cog-
nitive illusions can have on judgment.
A. Improving Judges' Judgment
The heuristics that create cognitive illusions are deeply ingrained
and are often useful decision aids, so it would be difficult forjudges to
refrain from using them. Nevertheless, judges can (and, we argue,
often do) make good decisions by learning to adopt multiple perspec-
tives on the problems confronting them, restricting their use of
heuristics to normatively appropriate circumstances, and distrusting
inclinations that are likely to be the product of cognitive illusions.
1. Adopting Multiple Perspectives
Judges may be able to reduce the effect of some cognitive illu-
sions by approaching decisions from multiple perspectives. For exam-
ple, the undesirable consequences of framing, which generally consist
of making choices that are too risky when faced only with potential
losses, can be overcome by recognizing that decisions can often be
characterized either as gains or as losses.215 In the copyright dispute
we described above, for example, the defendant appeared to face a
choice between a 50% chance of losing $200,000 at trial (plus $50,000
in attorneys' fees) and a certain $140,000 loss (in the form of a settle-
ment). The choice of whether to pay the $140,000 settlement, how-
ever, could be re-characterized as a $10,000 gain over the expected
loss of $150,000.216 Alternatively, the defendant could recognize that
it would still realize $60,000 in revenue on its alleged use of the copy-
right-protected materials if it accepted the settlement. Considering a
decision from different perspectives does not necessarily eliminate the
effects of decision frames, but it can reveal to the decision maker the
arbitrary nature of a frame's influence.
In their roles as case managers or settlement brokers, judges are
in a unique position to re-frame settlement decisions for the parties
because they have no stake in the outcome. Indeed, one possible rea-
son that framing effects influenced the settlement preferences of the
judges in our study to a lesser extent than other populations might be
that judges learn to consider a case from multiple frames. Because
215 See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, supra note 76, at 343-44;
Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Thewory, supra note 76, at 268-69; Tversky & Kahneman, Framt-
ing offDecisions, supra note 76, at 456; Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice, supra note 76, at
S257-58. A decision maker could also pursue a simple economic cost-benefit assessment of
the decision as a way of substituting a different, perhaps superior, cognitive process.
216 Popular books on negotiation suggest precisely this strategy. See, e.g., RoCER FIStiEt
& WILuAM URY, GETrN G TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 97-106 (2d
ed. 1991) (advising people to always consider their best alternative to a negotiated settle-
ment before entering into negotiations).
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judges will generally hear both sides of a dispute before (and during)
the time they act as mediators, the judges will have access to each
side's perspective. This makes it easier for the judge to see the case
through each potential frame.
Judges can, and should, make a conscious effort to re-frame deci-
sions that seem like losses because parties facing losses often under-
take undesirably risky (and costly) litigation strategies, such as
rejecting risk-neutral settlement offers. 217 As they gain experience
with settlement negotiations, many judges likely learn that
recharacterizing decision options can convince a litigant to abandon
an economically wasteful preference for trial. Judges should be
taught these techniques during their orientation or as part of other
training programs.
2. Limiting Heuristics to Normatively Appropriate Circumstances
Judges can also try to limit the use of heuristics to normatively
appropriate circumstances. For example, many anchors convey useful
information, so anchoring often improves the quality of a decision.
Meaningless anchors, however, lead people astray. As experienced de-
cision makers with some control over the information presented to
them, judges can limit their exposure to certain anchors. Judges
should be wary of simply relying on anchors supplied by litigants, such
as a plaintiff's lawyer's damage request, or other anchors unconnected
to the true value of the case, such as a statutory damage cap. Instead,
judges should use more reliable numerical reference points, such as a
composite of damage awards in similar cases.
In our study, for example, judges who declined to provide a dam-
age estimate in response to the anchoring question frequently ex-
pressed their frustration at the lack of reliable numerical anchors in
the problem. Severaljudges asserted that they could not answer with-
out knowing the plaintiff's age and annual salary. In effect, these
judges were searching for a reliable anchor. In our study, we deliber-
ately withheld any additional numbers that could be used as anchors,
so as to isolate the effect of the one anchor that we did provide. In an
actual case, several useful anchors (as well as other information) are
available to the judge.
Similarly, although the representativeness heuristic is frequently a
useful guide to evaluating evidence, it can lead people astray when
relevant background statistics are available. For example, judges
should regard a litigant's efforts to prove that a highly unlikely event
occurred with great suspicion. A rare event (such as the accident in
217 See Rachlinski, supra note 81, at 154-60 (arguing that the risk-seeking tendencies
that the loss frame produces encourages defendants to undertake risky litigation
strategies).
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our res ipsa loquitur problem) is more likely to be the extraordinary
product of a common cause (non-negligence) than the ordinary prod-
uct of an extraordinary cause (negligence). Rare events should not be
attributed to extraordinary causes without powerful evidence.218
The fact that the judges in our study performed better than other
experts on the res ipsa loquitur problem suggests that judicial experi-
ence might curb undue reliance on the representativeness heuristic.
Although scholars frequently criticize judges for failing to evaluate sta-
tistical evidence properly,219 judges have a wealth of experience evalu-
ating the probative value of evidence. This experience may have led
the judges in our study to distrust their inclination to rely on the simi-
larity between the evidence and the hypothesis it allegedly supports.
We doubt, for example, that judges are as swayed by potentially mis-
leading evidence, such as the apparent nervousness of a criminal de-
fendant, as juries, because judges have encountered countless nervous
defendants in their courtroom. Just as experience teaches judges how
to evaluate evidence appropriately, this skill can also be taught to new
judges.
3. Reducing Reliance on Tainted Judgments
Finally, judges can avoid relying on judgments that are especially
prone to distortion by cognitive illusions. Among the five illusions we
tested, the egocentric bias and the hindsight bias are essentially im-
possible to avoid. Egocentric beliefs are closely connected to good
mental health, especially in instances where those abilities are impor-
tant to one's personal or professional life. 220 Inflated beliefs in one's
personal and professional abilities allow people to enjoy a high sense
of self-esteem; in fact, only people who are depressed appear to pos-
sess an accurate portrait of their abilities. 221 Not only would it be diffi-
cult for judges to learn to avoid egocentric biases, it might be
inadvisable for them to try. On balance, the social benefits of having
confident, decisive judges likely outweigh the costs associated with an
occasional erroneous decision caused by such self-assurance.
Nevertheless, judges should temper their confidence in their abil-
ities. In circumstances that require judges to determine how sure they
are of their decisions (such as whether to certify an issue for interlocu-
tory appeal or to issue a certificate of appealability in a prisoners'
218 SeeThomas D. Lyon &JonathanJ. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Proba-
tive Value of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 46-47
(1996).
219 Id. at 45.
220 See SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND TIIE
HEALTHY MIND 59-65 (1989).
221 Id. at 214 ("[M]ildly depressed people actually have a somewhat more accurate
view of reality, at least about certain things, than do people who are not depressed.").
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rights case), judges should proceed with caution and search for inde-
pendent sources ofjudgment, if possible.2 22 For example, local rules
could be adjusted to encourage or require judges to assign a request
for a certificate of appealability to a differentjudge, even though this
would be much less efficient than allowing the same judge who made
the underlying decision to rule on it.
The hindsight bias poses the most troublesome problem for
judges. Learning the outcome has such profound and subtle effects
on people's beliefs that re-creating a past prediction is like trying to
cross the same river twice-upon learning the outcome the brain has
developed a new set of beliefs and can never really return to its previ-
ous state. Unfortunately, understanding the hindsight bias does noth-
ing to reduce its influence;223 neither does instructing subjects to be
careful to avoid its effects. 224 The judges in our study revealed a
strong hindsight bias. Previous research suggests that correcting for
the bias is not feasible.225
When confronted with judgments likely to be affected by the
hindsight bias, judges should distrust their intuitive assessments of
what parties could have predicted. Instead, they should rely on ex
ante standards of conduct, if available. For example, a defendant's
nonconformity or conformity with a regulatory safety standard might
be better evidence of the defendant's negligence or non-negligence
than an intuitive sense of whether a defendant seemed to have be-
haved reasonably or not. Legal reforms that would promote judg-
ments based on ex ante standards should also be considered and are
discussed below.
4. A Note on Judicial Specialization
In addition to the general strategies described above, judicial de-
cision making might also benefit from specialization on the bench.
Suppose, for example, that some judges functioned solely as adjudica-
tors, while others functioned solely as case managers. The full-time
trial judges should develop a better sense of when the representative-
ness heuristic leads them astray than judges who conduct trials only
part of the time. Similarly, the full-time managerial judges should be-
come more adept at helping litigants to avoid framing effects than
judges who occasionally supervise settlement conferences. Greater ex-
222 Ethical rules limiting ex partejudicial contacts generally forbidjudges from pursu-
ing the most obvious means of assessing the certainty of one's judgment-seeking an
outside opinion. See CHARLEs W. WoLFRAMt, MODERN LEGL ETHics § 11.3.3 (1986).
223 Rachlinski, supra note 104, at 586-88 (reviewing studies on %a)s to reduce the influ-
ence of the hindsight bias).
224 Id at 586.
225 Id.
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perience, training, and specialization should enable judges to make
better decisions.
B. Juries Versus Judges
Reformers commonly propose that the legal system should rely
more heavily on judges than juries as a means of reducing the influ-
ence of cognitive errors in the courtroom. 226 Recent years, in fact,
have witnessed increasing distrust of juries and numerous efforts to
curb their authority.227 Although previous research has shown that
cognitive illusions influence juries, 228 the results of our study suggest
that choosing the optimal decision maker requires a comparison of
the relative strengths and weaknesses of judges and juries.2 29
Even though the results of our study demonstrate that relying on
judges would not cure all of the problems that cognitive illusions cre-
ate for the justice system, our study provides insight into when judges
are more likely than juries to make unbiased decisions (and vice
versa). Judges are likely to be better decision makers in circumstances
where decision-making experience can blunt the effects of cognitive
illusions. For example, even though our results suggest that judges
rely on anchors as much as juries do, judges might avoid some of the
unwanted effects of anchoring if they are aware of awards in compara-
ble cases and can use this information as a source of anchors. Al-
though anchors from similar cases might be somewhat inaccurate, at
least they are not provided by litigants. In contrast to judges, jurors
are less likely to have comparable information at their disposal and
may be more susceptible to partisan anchors, such as damage requests
made by plaintiffs' attorneys.
Judges are also in a better position to determine whether evi-
dence is relevant. Relevance is largely a statistical concept that is easily
misunderstood. Judges are less likely than jurors to rely on heuristics
like representativeness that can lead to erroneous evidentiary determi-
nations. Suppose, for instance, that a prosecutor wanted to introduce
testimony that carpet fibers from a criminal defendant's home
matched carpet fibers found at a crime scene. Further suppose that
the forensic test used to make the match also finds that the carpet
fiber found at the crime scene is extremely common and would match
226 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 115, at 1501; Sunstein et al., supra note 16, at 2127;
Viscusi, supra note 21, at 60.
227 Mark Curriden, Putting the Squeeze on Juries, A.BA.J., Aug. 2000, at 52, 53.
228 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
229 Professors Kalven and Zeisel noted decades ago in their well-known empirical study
thatjudges and juries usually agree on trial verdicts, but they diverge in other, predictable
circumstances. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 104-17 (1966).
Kalven and Zeisel found that disparate assessments of evidence produced most of the
judge-jury disagreements. Id. at 115.
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carpet fibers in 90% of the homes in the United States. The testimony
that the fibers match is of almost no relevance to the defendant's
guilt. Experienced judges are unlikely to admit such evidence or to
give it much weight. Jurors encountering this information for the first
time, however, are more likely to perceive the evidence as relevant.
Although our results support greater reliance on judges in cir-
cumstances where experience and training can facilitate avoidance of
cognitive illusions, they also identify important advantages juries have
over judges. Juries consist of groups, and group deliberation might
reduce some illusions of judgment.2 30 Consider, for example, the
hindsight bias, which is virtually impossible to purge from legal deci-
sion making and influences both jurors and experienced judges alike.
Part of the reason the hindsight bias occurs is that learning the out-
come alters people's memories of the preceding events; people re-
member more information that is consistent with the known outcome
than is inconsistent with the known outcome.2' Because groups usu-
ally remember more of the relevant facts than individuals, group deci-
sion making can mitigate some of the hindsight bias's influence,
suggesting thatjuries might more successfully avoid the hindsight bias
than judges.
Another important advantage of a jury trial is that it creates a
mechanism for keeping potentially misleading information away from
the fact finder. Ajudge will always know about subsequent remedial
measures and statutory damage caps, whereas this information can be
kept from juries. Generally, when the only means of avoiding the ef-
fect of a cognitive illusion is to restrict access to the information that
triggers it, ajury trial has a substantial advantage over a bench trial.
On balance, then, our results suggest that those clamoring for
judges to replace juries should proceed with caution. Judges are likely
to make better decisions in certain circumstances because their train-
ing and experience will enable them to avoid the more pernicious
effects of such cognitive decision-making phenomena as the represen-
tativeness heuristic. On the other hand, group decision making or
the insulation afforded by a judicial gatekeeper may enable juries to
make better decisions than judges in other circumstances.
230 See PLOUS, supra note 8, at 211-14 (reviewing comparisons of group and individual
judgment and concluding that group decision making reduces biases in some cases).
Groups pose problems of their own, however, and can sometimes make worse decisions
than individuals. See David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating
About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L REv. 1139, 1164-66 (2000); Ca R. Sunstein,
Essay: Deliberative Trouble?. Wzy Groups Go to Extirnes, 110 YALE LJ. 71 (2000).
231 Hawkins & Hastie, supra note 102, at 321.
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C. Legal Rules That Avoid Illusions of Judgment
The legal system might also adopt procedural, evidentiary, and
even substantive rules to minimize the deleterious effects of cognitive
illusions on judicial decision making. By adopting such rules, the sys-
tem can avoid placing judges in a position in which cognitive illusions
are likely to lead them astray. It is much easier to avoid stepping on a
patch of ice than it is to keep your footing once you have stepped on
it. Indeed, some legal rules appear to represent an effort by judges or
legislators to avoid the effects of these illusions of judgment.232
For example, Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence repre-
sents an adaptation to the effects of the hindsight bias.233 By exclud-
ing from evidence subsequent remedial measures taken by the
defendant, Rule 407 precludes the fact finder from taking this infor-
mation into consideration when assessing ex post whether the defen-
dant behaved reasonably at the time of the accident. Similarly, courts
often rely on ex ante standards of conduct rather than ex post deter-
minations of "reasonableness" as a means of reducing the hindsight
bias.234 In medical malpractice cases, for instance, courts are asked
not to make ex post determinations about whether the defendant be-
haved "reasonably." Instead, they are charged with inquiring into
whether the defendant behaved in a manner consistent with custom-
ary practices established ex ante by the medical profession.235 Simi-
larly, in corporate law, courts refuse to hold officers and directors of
corporations liable for negligent business decisions because these de-
cisions, though seemingly wise in foresight, may seem foolish in
hindsight.2 36
Several legal rules also arguably reflect efforts to temper the ef-
fects of egocentric biases. Egocentric biases lead people to be more
confident in their decisions than is normatively appropriate. People
influenced by egocentric biases might make more extreme decisions
than are warranted by the available information. For example, judges
and juries might be so confident in their verdicts that they are willing
to impose severe penalties (including death) or award extremely high
damages, even in cases in which the facts are too uncertain to support
such extreme decisions. The availability of multiple judicial appeals
might be an effort to counteract the potentially overconfident assign-
ment of the death penalty; the availability of this review reflects, at the
very least, a recognition that the trial process can make mistakes, even
232 See generally Rachlinski, supra note 157 (discussing adaptations in the legal system to
cognitive illusions).
233 FED. R. EVID. 407.
234 See Rachlinski, supra note 104, at 608-13.
235 Id at 612.
236 Id. at 621.
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when the decision maker is sure enough of the facts to sentence some-
one to death. Likewise, damage caps might reflect a systematic effort
to temper overconfident civil verdicts. Political concerns support
both the availability of multiple appeals in death-penalty cases and
damage caps in civil cases, but each might also reflect conscious or
subconscious efforts to combat the consequences of egocentric biases
in the trial courts.
There is some danger that adopting reforms to reduce the effects
of a single cognitive illusion will skew the litigation process because
any single reform will fail to reduce the effects of other illusions. Fur-
thermore, efforts to curb the effects of a single illusion might have an
adverse effect on one category of litigants. For example, the hindsight
bias generally benefits tort plaintiffs because it makes it seem as if the
defendant had a greater ability to predict the adverse outcome than
was actually true. Similarly, anchoring makes it easier for plaintiffs to
obtain higher damage awards, because defendants typically cannot
provide an anchor without implicitly admitting that they should be
held liable. If the legal system reforms these illusions without remedy-
ing others that benefit defendants, then the reforms will skew the sys-
tem against plaintiffs. Nevertheless, failing to adopt reforms that
reduce the effect of cognitive illusions also skews the system and en-
sures that the system produces more errors than it otherwise might.
CONCLUSION
"The aim of the American legal system is liberty and justice for
all. How close we come to that aim depends on goodjudging."2 7 We
are confident that mostjudges attempt to "reach their decisions utiliz-
ing facts, evidence, and highly constrained legal criteria, while putting
aside personal biases, attitudes, emotions, and other individuating fac-
tors."238 Despite their best efforts, however, judges are vulnerable to
the influence of the cognitive illusions that we have described in this
Article.
Our study demonstrates that judges rely on the same cognitive
decision-making process as laypersons and other experts, which leaves
them vulnerable to cognitive illusions that can produce poor judg-
ments. Even ifjudges have no bias or prejudice against either litigant,
fully understand the relevant law, and know all of the relevant facts,
they might still make systematically erroneous decisions under some
circumstances simply because of how they--like all human beings-
think.
237 K=ON, supra note 3, at 1.
238 Nugent, supra note 21, at 4; see also Harry T. Edw-ards, TheJudirial Funcion and the
Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L RF-. 837, 838 (iJudges] strive, most
often successfully, to decide cases in accord ith the law.).
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All is not bleak, however, because judges, litigants, and legislators
can take steps to minimize the effects of these cognitive illusions. Nev-
ertheless, these illusions will persist. Additional psychological and le-
gal scholarship is needed to explore the various ways that the
cognitive processes of legal actors can and should influence the ad-
ministration of justice. A greater understanding of these cognitive
processes can only improve the legal system, whereas ignorance can
only undermine it. As Judge Jerome Frank put it:
To the extent that one goes to sleep in a dream of attainable perfec-
tion, he becomes the victim of uncertainties which he ignores and
for which he therefore fails to allow. The courageous attitude of
accepting uncertainties makes one's world picture more complex;
life is disclosed as far more precarious and difficult to conciliate.
But, just in proportion as we learn more about what was previously
undetected, we reduce the dangers of being crushed by unobserved
dangers. That is the paradox of wisdom: Insofar as we become
mindful that life must be less perfect than we would like it to be, we
approach nearer to perfection. 23 9
239 FRANK, supra note 4, at 426.
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